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The Case to Be Made for Proposed
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial
Code: What's a Trillion Dollars
between Friends?!
BY MICHAL I. SPAK*
INTRODUCTION
As the title of this article indicates, over a trillion dollars is
transferred 6lectronically between business and financial institutions
by means of what are referred to in the banking industry as
"wholesale wire transfers."' While many other types of financial
transactions are extensively governed by existing state and federal
law, there is no comprehensive body of law governing the rights
and obligations of parties arising from these wire transfer trans-
actions. 2 Payments by check are covered under Articles 3 and 4 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), while many aspects of
credit card transactions are covered by various state and federal
laws, most notably the Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1978
(EFTA),3 which addresses itself to a broad spectrum of consumer
financial transactions, and the federal Truth in Lending laws. 4
The only uniform legal rules that pertain to wholesale wire
transfers are to be culled from four sources: (1) the regulations
governing the two principal wire transfer systems in the United
States, the Federal Reserve wire transfer network (Fedwire) and
* Professor of Law, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.S. 1958, J.D. 1961, DePaul
University; LL.M. 1962, Northwestern University. The author acknowledges the highly
original contributions of Jeffrey Eric Margulis, Esq., a member of the Illinois Bar. Funding
for this article was provided by the Marshall Ewell Research Fund at IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
I Brandel & Davenport, Modernizing U.S. Payment Systems Law, 9 Bus. Law.
Update 5, May/June 1989, at 2.
2 See U.C.C. §§ 4A-101 to 4A-507 prefatory note at iii (1990) (Uniform Commercial
Code-Funds Transfer) [hereinafter Prefatory Note]. All citations to Article 4A refer to the
1990 Official Text with Comments.
3 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693-1693r (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
- 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1631-1667e (West 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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the New York Clearing House Interbank Payments Systems
(CHIPS); (2) the uniform rules of various regional bank associa-
tions throughout the United States; (3) the rules of the National
Automated Clearing House Association on credit transfers; and (4)
Federal Reserve Bank rules and operating circulars.s These uniform
rules, however, only cover the limited technical aspects of these
transactions and do not resolve broader issues which depend on
such variables as the contract between the parties and the extent
to which courts are willing to make an analogy to the law which
governs similar types of payment mechanisms. 6 There is, however,
no consensus as to the rights and obligations created by the various
wholesale wire transfer systems; Article 4A of the U.C.C. is de-
signed to address the uncertainty in this area of the law.7
Article 4A is precisely what is needed in this era of upheaval
in the banking system. With the advent of proposed wholesale
revisions to the federal banking laws, which would aim to increase
interstate banking and open up investment banking opportunities
to the nation's commercial banks heretofore barred under the
Glass-Steagall Act,8 the frequency and volume of wire transfer
activity can only increase. In order to handle this inevitable growth
in wire transfer transactions, it is crucial to have a uniform set of
rules in place to protect the justifiable expectations of the parties
involved. There must be a predictable scheme of rules to enable
parties to foresee and insure against risks, adjust operational and
security procedures, and price funds transfers appropriately.9 This
need for predictability is especially crucial when viewed in light of
the increasing volume of money being moved through wire trans-
fers. 10 Article 4A is a coherent and effective response to the cur-
rently intractable legal issues that wire transfer activity creates. It
strikes the appropriate balance among the competing interests of
the banks providing funds transfer services, the commercial and
institutional users of those services, and the public interest.
This Article first addresses the scope of Article 4A.1 Then a
brief introduction to the fundamentals of Article 4A is presented
See Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at iii; see also Miller & Davenport, Introduction
to the Special Issue on the Uniform Commercial Code, 45 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1391 (1990).
6 See Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at iii.
7 Id.
I The Glass-Steagall Act is the popular name of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48
Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
9 U.C.C. § 4A-102 comment.
10 See id.
" See infra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
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to familiarize the reader with its operation.' 2 This Article concludes
by arguing that Article 4A offers precisely the sort of guidance
that courts are grappling for in dealing with the currently uncharted
legal territory of wire transfer transactions. 13
I. ScoPE OF ARTICLE 4A
Article 4A 4 defines its scope of operation by first stating that
it generally applies to "funds transfers,' ' 5 which are defined as
the series of transactions that begin with an "originator" making
a "payment order" for the purpose of making a payment to a
"beneficiary" of the order.' 6
This seemingly broad scope is subsequently winnowed down to
focus Article 4A's operation on a particular arena of funds transfer
activity involving large amounts of money, highly sophisticated
parties, and rapid transaction speed. 17 First, Article 4A explicitly
includes "credit transfer" transactions and explicitly excludes "debit
transfer" transactions. 8 The identity of the party giving instruc-
tions distinguishes these two transactions. In a credit transaction,
the person making payment gives the instruction to pay, while in
a debit transaction, the person receiving payment gives the instruc-
tion to pay. 19 Thus, in a debit transaction the person receiving
payment has been given authority by the debtor to draw on the
debtor's bank account. 20 Because of the different mechanisms em-
ployed in credit and debit transactions, the drafters were in accord
that these two types of funds transfers should not be governed by
the same statute. 21
Second, Article 4A is limited in its operation to funds transfer
activity carried out by banking institutions, since a "funds transfer
system," as defined by Article 4A, is a "wire transfer network,
12 See infra notes 38-411 and accompanying text.
11 See infra note 412 and accompanying text.
14 U.C.C. §§ 4A-101 to 4A-507 (1990) (Uniform Code-Funds Transfers).
,1 See U.C.C. § 4A-102.
36 See U.C.C. § 4A-104. For definitions of those terms, see infra notes 39-54 and
accompanying text.
17 See Prefatory Note, supra note 2, at iii.
18 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(ii)-(iii); see also id. § 4A-104 comment 4; Prefatory
Note, supra note 2, at iii.
," U.C.C. § 4A-104 comment 4.
20 Id.
21 See Fry, Basic Concepts in Article 4A: Scope and Definitions, 45 Bus. LAW. 1401,
1403-04 (1989).
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automated clearing house, or other communication system of a
clearing house or other association of banks through which a
payment order by a bank may be transmitted to the bank to which
the order is addressed." 22 Moreover, the fact that a payment order
is defined in terms of "bank" payments indicates the restriction
of Article 4A's scope to transactions within the banking system.23
Also explicitly excluded from the scope of Article 4A are con-
sumer transactions that contain any element governed by the
EFTA.2 However, the drafters did envision resort to Article 4A
by analogy, to resolve issues relating to parts of consumer trans-
actions not covered by EFTA, where no other law governs the
non-EFTA components of the transaction. 2
Additionally, transactions involving checks and credit cards are
excised from Article 4A's reach. 26 An Article 4A "payment order"
must involve a payment instruction that is transmitted directly by
the sender to the receiving bank.27 In check and credit card trans-
actions, the payment instruction is transmitted from the sender to
the beneficiary, who then presents the instruction for payment to
the sender's bank, either directly or indirectly through the bank
collection process. 28 These transactions are already addressed in
Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. as well as federal law. 29
A final category of excluded transactions are those in which
the payment instruction states a condition of payment other than
the time of payment.30 Often, the presentation of documents is a
payment condition, such as when the beneficiary of a letter of
credit is entitled to payment only upon presentation of documents
proving that goods have been shipped. 3' Conditional payment in-
structions are not characteristic of the sort of high speed, low cost
transactions that Article 4A was meant to embrace. 32 This type of
conditional payment instruction entails necessary delay in procuring
2 See U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(5).
23 See id. § 4A-104 comment 2. Article 4A defines the term "bank" to include savings
and loan institutions, credit unions, trust companies, and also Federal Reserve and foreign
banks. See id. § 4A-105(a)(2) & comment 1.
- See id. § 4A-108.
21 See id. § 4A-108 comment.
26 See id. § 4A-104 comment 5.
2 See id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(iii).
21 See id. § 4A-104 comment 5.
See id.
See id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(i).
' See id. § 4A-104 comment 3.
32 See id.
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documentation and imposes additional costs on the banks involved
in authenticating such documentation. 33 These slower, more expen-
sive transactions are more appropriately treated under other appli-
cable law, such as Article 5 of the U.C.C., which governs letters
of credit. 34
One additional aspect of the scope of Article 4A concerns the
importance (or rather non-importance) of the "medium" by which
a funds transfer is effected.35 While most of the funds transfer
activity contemplated by Article 4A is done electronically by means
of wire transmission, the employment of electronic means of trans-
fer is not a predicate to the applicability of Article 4A. 36 Article
4A recognizes transmission of a payment instruction from the
sender to the receiving bank by oral or written communication. 37
II. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF ARTICLE 4A
A. The Payment Order
Article 4A's 38 central theme is the "payment order," which
begins the funds transfer process. A payment order must possess
a number of essential elements to be subject to Article 4A. First,
it must be an instruction given by the sender to the receiving bank
to pay, or cause another bank to pay, a "fixed or determinable
amount of money to a beneficiary. ' 39 Since the drafters did not
comment regarding any special treatment to be given the require-
ment of "fixed or determinable," it should be interpreted along
the same lines as it is construed under Article 3 of the U.C.C. 40
Thus, so long as the amount to be paid is calculable by some
formula (i.e., foreign currency conversion or interest rate specified)
then the amount is "fixed and determinable" within the meaning
of Article 4A.
31 See id.
See id. §§ 5-101 to 5-117 (comprising Article 5).
"5 See id. § 4A-104 comment 6.
6 See id.
37 See id.
3' U.C.C. §§ 4A-101 to 4A-507 (1990) (Uniform Commercial Code-Funds Transfers).
3: See id. § 4A-103(a)(1).
40 See Fry, supra note 21, at 1408 n.38 (commenting on the meaning to be given
Article 4A's "fixed or determinable" requirement for payment order amounts by referring
to U.C.C. § 3-104(a)'s requirement of "a fixed or readily ascertainable amount of money,"
and U.C.C. § 3-104(b)'s requirement of a promise or order to pay "a sum certain in
money").
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An Article 4A payment order must meet several additional
requirements: (1) the order must state no condition for payment
other than the time at which it is to be made;41 (2) the transaction
involved must be a credit transfer and not a debit transfer;42 and
(3) it must entail an instruction transmitted by the sender directly
to the receiving bank or to an agent or funds transfer system for
transmittal to the receiving bank.43 The reader should note that the
elements of the payment order are directly tied in to the scope of
Article 4A. 44 Thus, the careful practitioner must be certain to meet
each and every one of these requisites to ensure the application of
Article 4A's provisions.
B. The Cast of Characters
The funds transfer process begins with the "sender," the person
that sets the wheels in motion by instructing the receiving bank
with a payment order. 45 On some occasions, the sender may be the
same person as the beneficiary of the payment. For example, a
corporation that ordered a bank to transfer funds from one of its
accounts to another at that or another bank would be both a
sender and a beneficiary. 46
The "receiving bank" is defined as the bank to which the
sender's payment order is addressed. 47 A receiving bank may also
become a sender when it carries out a sender's payment order by
transmitting a second payment order to another bank requesting a
payment to be made to the person specified in the original sender's
payment order. 4 The process can continue in a chain of transac-
tions, where a number of banks receive and in turn send payment
orders to other banks to execute the original payment order. Each
bank that receives a payment order and then issues its own payment
order to effectuate the first one acts as both a receiving bank and
a sender within the meaning of Article 4A.
Also involved in this process is the "originator." The originator
is defined in Article 4A as "the sender of the first payment order
41 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(1)(i).
42 See id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(ii); id. § 4A-104 comment 4.
43 See id. § 4A-103(a)(1)(iii); id. § 4A-104 comment 5.
" See supra notes 15-37 and accompanying text.
41 See U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(5).
46 See id. § 4A-104 comment 1.
- See id. § 4A-103(a)(4).
41 See id. § 4A-104 comment I (providing illustrative cases).
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in a funds transfer. ' 49 In the payment order chain scenario dis-
cussed above, there can be any number of senders involved, but
only the sender of the first payment order in the chain can be the
originator.
Along with the originator, Article 4A also defines the role of
the "originator's bank." The originator's bank is "(i) the receiving
bank to which the payment order of the originator is issued if the
originator is not a bank, or (ii) the originator if the originator is
a bank. '50
Another definitional distinction drawn by Article 4A is found
in the term "intermediary bank." The intermediary bank is any
bank in the chain of the transaction other than the originator's
bank or the beneficiary's bank.5 1 Thus, in any transaction where
either the originator's bank is the same bank as the beneficiary's
bank or the originator's bank sends a payment order directly to
the beneficiary's bank, there are no intermediary banks involved.5 2
At the end of the chain of banks involved in the funds transfer
transaction is the "beneficiary's bank." Article 4A defines this
bank as the "bank identified in a payment order in which an
account of the beneficiary is to be credited pursuant to the order
or which otherwise is to make payment to the beneficiary if the
order does not provide for payment to an account." 53 In other
words, the beneficiary's bank is the bank that is directed to or in
fact does give the beneficiary the money due from the payment
order.
Another important actor in this transactional drama is the
"beneficiary." Article 4A defines the beneficiary as "the person
to be paid by the beneficiary's bank." ' 54 This seems a bit of a
circular way to refer to this most crucial character in the transac-
tion. Perhaps a more helpful definition would characterize the
beneficiary as the person whom the originator intends to pay when
he transmits the payment order to the receiving bank.
Article 4A mentions the "customer" as another character in
its schematic. A customer is "a person, including a bank, having
an account with a bank or from whom a bank has agreed to
,9 See id. § 4A-104().
- Id. § 4A-104(d).
51 See id. § 4A-104(b).
52 See Fry, supra note 21, at 1413.
3 U.C.C. § 4A-103(a)(3).
- Id. § 4A-103(a)(2).
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receive payment orders. ' 55 Thus a customer can be a person that
has a standing agreement with a bank for the execution of the
customer's payment orders or, simply, any other person without
such a standing agreement that approaches a bank and requests
that his payment order be executed.5 6
Tied in with the role of the customer is the "authorized ac-
count," also provided for in Article 4A. The authorized account
is a deposit account of the customer that is designated by the
customer as the source of funds for his payment order(s).5 7 If the
customer does not designate an authorized account, out of which
payment orders are to be funded, any account of the customer at
the bank will be an authorized account for the purposes of Article
4A, so long as such usage would be consonant with any restrictions
previously agreed to by the customer and the bank regarding use
of that account.5 8 The drafters of Article 4A were persuaded by
wire transfer users that the customer should be able to specify the
account to be used for payment order funding since specification
would be instrumental in guarding against any unauthorized use
of payment orders by means of accessing other customer accounts
at a bank.5 9
One caveat to this description of the funds transfer process
must be made regarding requests by an originator to make more
than one payment to a beneficiary. Where, for example, an origi-
nator instructs a bank to make payments to X at regular intervals
for a continuing service or regular shipments of goods, the blanket
payment instruction to the bank is treated by Article 4A as a
separate payment order with respect to each payment made to the
named beneficiary.60
The funds transfer user that sends payment orders (or any
cancellation/amendments thereto) to a receiving bank by means of
a funds transfer system or other third party communications net-
work should also be aware that such intermediaries are not liable,
under Article 4A, for mistransmission of the sender's payment
order. The funds transfer system or third party communications
system is deemed to be an agent of the sender under Article 4A.
S Id. § 4A-105(a)(3).
56 See Fry, supra note 21, at 1422 & n.112.
57 See U.C.C. § 4A-105(a)(1).
s See id.
19 See Fry, supra note 21, at 1421.
See U.C.C. § 4A-103(b).
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Thus, liability for mistransmission, if any, must be determined by
resort to agency law. 61
Now that the reader has been familiarized with the parties to
the funds transfer transaction, an analysis of the process itself is
in order.
C. The Funds Transfer Process
The process begins when the sender gives the payment order to
the receiving bank. At this point, the sender has made what Article
4A refers to as a "request" to the bank to execute the payment
order.62 The request can either be accepted or rejected, unless the
bank has agreed to accept such payment orders or a funds transfer
system rule requires acceptance .6  The duties and obligations in-
cumbent upon a receiving bank do not begin until the bank chooses
to accept the payment order. 4 During the pre-acceptance period,
however, the receiving bank may be liable for lost interest to the
sender for delay in giving notice of rejection of the payment order
past the requested payment date.65
The acceptance of a payment order by a receiving bank can
occur in a variety of ways under Article 4A, as the discussion
below explains.
1. Acceptance by the Receiving Bank When the Receiving Bank
is Not the Beneficiary's Bank
When the receiving bank is not the same bank as the benefi-
ciary's bank, the receiving bank manifests acceptance under Article
4A when it executes the payment order.66 An understanding of
such acceptance depends on a proper explanation of payment order
execution.
Execution occurs when the- receiving bank issues a payment
order to carry out the payment order given to it by the sender.67
When a bank executes a payment order it incurs the following
61 See id. § 4A-206; see also Baxter & Bhala, The Interrelationship of Article 4A With
Other Law, 45 Bus. LAW. 1485, 1500-01 (1990) (discussing the application of agency law
to this problem).
62 See U.C.C. § 4A-209 comment 1.
63 See id., comment 3.
- See id. § 4A-212.
65 See id. § 4A-209(b)(3), § 4A-212 comment.
6See id. § 4A-209(a).
See id. § 4A-301(a).
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obligations under Article 4A: (1) it must issue a payment order
that complies with the sender's order and follows the sender's
instructions regarding (i) the medium to be used for carrying out
the funds transfer or (ii) the means by which funds are to be
transmitted; (2) it must advise any intermediary bank involved in
the funds transfer about the instructions of the original sender; (3)
in cases where the sender indicates a desire for the transaction to
be carried out by telephone or wire transfer, or otherwise asks for
the most expeditious means of transfer, the receiving bank must
employ such means and instruct any intermediary banks to do the
same; and (4) the receiving bank must transmit its payment order
in sufficient time to allow payment to the beneficiary on the
sender's requested payment date, if any, or as soon thereafter as
is feasible.68
If the receiving bank executes the payment order before the
sender's requested payment date, resulting in payment to the ben-
eficiary before the requested payment date, acceptance will not
occur until the requested payment date.69 Thus, the sender will not
be required to pay the receiving bank until the requested payment
date, even though the receiving bank may be required to pay before
that date for the payment order it issued in executing the sender's
payment order. 70 Such an occurrence would result in a loss of
interest to the receiving bank. Moreover, if the bank executes early,
it risks cancellation of or amendment to the payment order by the
sender; in the event of a cancellation by the sender, the sender will
not be obliged to pay the receiving bank, but the receiving bank
will have to resort to the law of mistake and restitution to recover
its money from the beneficiary it paid prematurely.7' Thus a prime
concern for banks' counsel under Article 4A will be avoidance of
this early execution trap since Article 4A places the risk of loss on
the banks. 72
2. Acceptance by the Receiving Bank When the Receiving Bank
is Also the Beneficiary's Bank
When the receiving bank is also the beneficiary's bank, accep-
tance of the sender's payment order does not occur through exe-
Is Id. § 4A-302(a) & comment 1.
6 See id. § 4A-209(d) & comment 9.
70 See id.
71 See id.
7 See id. The case illustration incorporated in comment 9 is particularly helpful in
illuminating the intricacies of the early execution problem.
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cution. 73 This can be explained by reference to the differing functions
of the receiving bank and the beneficiary bank in the funds transfer
process.7 4 The receiving bank accepts by issuing a payment order
of its own complying with the sender's payment order.7 5 The ben-
eficiary bank, however, generally accepts by crediting the benefi-
ciary's account with the proceeds of the incoming payment order
and notifying the beneficiary. 76 This difference explains the separate
treatment of acceptance by beneficiary banks and non-beneficiary
banks in the funds transfer process.
Article 4A provides three means by which the beneficiary bank
can be said to have accepted the payment order it has received
from either the receiving bank or an intermediary bank, with
acceptance occurring at the earliest of the three. 7
First, acceptance by the beneficiary bank can occur upon the
beneficiary bank either (a) making payment to the beneficiary's
account or (b) notifying the beneficiary of either (1) the receipt of
the payment order or (2) of the account being credited as a result
of the order's receipt.78 Notice of receipt of the order, however,
will not operate as acceptance if the notice specifies that the order
has been rejected or that funds may not be withdrawn until the
sender's payment has been received. 79
Second, acceptance by the beneficiary bank can occur when
the beneficiary bank receives payment of the entire amount of the
sender's order.80 This provision of Article 4A is applicable when
the beneficiary bank mistakenly credits the account of the wrong
person with the payment from the sender. In such a case, the bank
will be deemed to have accepted by virtue of having received
payment. Thus, the beneficiary bank will have to pay the correct
beneficiary and resort to the law of mistake and restitution to
recover any losses sustained.81
Third, and finally, the beneficiary bank may also accept by its
inaction.8 2 The beneficiary bank will be deemed to have accepted
73 See id. § 4A-301 comment I.
74 See id. § 4A-209 comment 4.
" See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
76 See U.C.C. § 4A-209 comment 4.
- See id. § 4A-209(b).
,8 See id. § 4A-209(b)(1) & comment 5.
7 See id. § 4A-209(b)(1).
See id. § 4A-209(b)(2).
81 See id. § 4A-209 comment 6.
1 See id. § 4A-209 comment 7.
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if, at the opening of business on the next funds-transfer business
day 3 following the payment date of the sender's payment order,
either (a) the amount of the sender's payment order is covered by
a withdrawable sum in an authorized account 84 of the sender or
(b) the beneficiary bank has received full payment from the sender.85
Acceptance is created by inaction, provided that the order was not
rejected by the beneficiary bank within the allowable time limits
for rejection under Article 4A.86
Thus, for receiving banks and beneficiary banks to accept a
payment order and thereby incur the rights and obligations that
result under Article 4A, there are two distinct means of acceptance.
For receiving banks, acceptance is generally accomplished by exe-
cution of the sender's payment order through issuing its own
payment order in compliance. For beneficiary banks, acceptance is
accomplished either by (i) payment or notice of receipt to the
83 Article 4A defines "funds-transfer business day" as that part of the day during
which the receiving bank is open for the receipt, processing, and transmittal of payment
orders and cancellations and amendments of payment orders. See id. § 4A-105(a)(4). While
a bank's computer can be programmed to receive payment orders and payment order
instructions 24 hours a day year-round, the bank may not necessarily be open at the time
the computer receives an order or instruction. See id. § 4A-105 comment 2. In that case,
the computer will be programmed to store the order or instruction until the beginning of
the next funds-transfer business day when it will be retrieved from the computer and acted
upon. Id. Moreover, the receiving bank also has the discretion to fix cut-off times during
its designated funds-transfer business day, after which orders or instructions may be treated
as having been received at the opening of business on the next funds-transfer business day.
See id. § 4A-106(a). The receiving bank may establish different cut-off times for payment
orders as opposed to payment order instructions as well as different times for different
senders and categories of payment orders. See id.
Although there was some concern among members of the drafting committee that
worked on Article 4A as to potential delay in payment order action resulting from the
discretion vested in the receiving banks to fix their designated funds-transfer business day
and cut-off times, this discretion was left unfettered. See Fry, supra note 21, at 1423 n.123.
The sentiment of the consensus was that the competitive pressures to keep and retain funds-
transfer business, plus the industry practice of accommodating time-sensitive funds transfer
requests, would prevent any excessive delay for funds transfer users. See id.
14 See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (explaining authorized accounts under
Article 4A).
83 See U.C.C. § 4A-209(b)(3) & comment 7. As the comments explain, this provision
was written bearing in mind that banks often cannot know how much money will be left
in a customer's bank account after numerous transactions pertaining to that account have
taken place during a business day. Thus, the verifiable balance will be determined as of the
opening of business on the first funds-transfer business day following the payment date of
the sender's order.
6 See id. Article 4A provides that the beneficiary bank has the power to prevent this
automatic acceptance by means of rejecting the order. See infra notes 88-112 and accom-
panying text (discussing rejection).
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beneficiary; (ii) receipt of the full amount of the payment order;
or (iii) inaction if the sender's account is sufficient to cover the
balance of his payment order.87
3. Rejection of the Payment Order
Article 4A also provides receiving banks that are also benefi-
ciary banks an effective means by which to avoid acceptance and
its resulting obligations. The provided means is a "rejection" of
the payment order. Rejection is not necessary for the prevention
of acceptance by a receiving bank that is not also the beneficiary
bank to a transaction. Such a bank can only accept by execution
through issuance of its own payment order in compliance with the
sender's payment order.8 A receiving bank that is also the bene-
ficiary bank, however, can be deemed to have accepted by inac-
tion,89 so rejection offers these banks a means by which they can
affirmatively act to defeat this automatic acceptance. 9° Also, even
though it is not required of them, receiving banks that are not also
beneficiary banks routinely will give notice of rejection for a variety
of reasons (e.g., ambiguity in the payment order, technical prob-
lems at the receiving bank, or insufficient funds in the sender's
account) .91
Rejection can be accomplished by a notice of rejection, trans-
mitted to the sender orally, electronically, or in writing. 92 There is
no requirement that the notice of rejection use any magic words.
It is effective if it communicates to the sender that the order will
not be executed or paid.93 Transmission of the notice of rejection
must be by a means that is reasonable under the circumstances,
otherwise it will not be effective until it is received. 94 If the method
of transmitting rejection notices is specified by agreement of the
parties, it will be considered reasonable. Any noncomplying mode
will be deemed unreasonable, unless no significant delay results
from its use. 9
" See U.C.C. § 4A-209(b).
" See id. § 4A-210 comment 1.
9 See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
10 See U.C.C. § 4A-210 comment 2.
91 See id. § 4A-210 comment 1.
92 See id. § 4A-210(a).
91 See id.
9, See id.
95 See id.
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Thus for the beneficiary bank wishing to reject an incoming
payment order, a notice of rejection will be necessary to prevent
the automatic acceptance envisioned by Article 4A. Such rejection
to prevent automatic acceptance must occur either before or within
one hour of the time that automatic acceptance occurs under the
rules.96 This means that a beneficiary bank's deadline for an effec-
tive rejection will be fixed at one hour from the opening of the
first funds-transfer business day following the payment date of the
payment order. 97 In cases where such notice is not feasible, there
is the alternative deadline of one hour from the opening of the
business day of the sender.98 For example, if the sender is in
California and the beneficiary bank is in New York, and the sender
would not be open for business to receive a rejection notice until
several hours had elapsed from the opening of the New York
bank's funds-transfer business day, the latter deadline could be
used to protect the New York bank.99
Despite this alternative deadline, if the sender receives the
notice of rejection after the requested payment date, the bank must
pay interest to the sender if the sender's account is non-interest
bearing.10° The interest is to be paid for each day that receipt of
the rejection notice is delayed beyond the payment date, 0' and its
rate is calculated on the basis of either (i) the agreement of the
parties or (ii) any applicable funds transfer system rules. 12 In the
event that there is neither a contract nor an applicable funds
transfer system rule, a further provision of Article 4A details a
somewhat complex formula, based on the Federal Funds rate and
the number of days the notice of rejection arrives beyond the
requested payment date. 0 3
While, as noted above, receiving banks that are not also the
beneficiary bank need not issue a notice of rejection to prevent
See id. § 4A-209 comment 8.
9 See id.; see also supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing the definition
of the "funds-transfer business day").
91 See U.C.C. § 4A-209 comment 8; see also id. § 4A-209(b)(3).
9 See id. § 4A-209 comment 8.
too See id.
to, See id.
102 See id. § 4A-506(a).
103 See id. § 4A-506(b) & comment 1. The comment provides a helpful illustration of
how this formula would be used to calculate the interest that would be paid for a typical
delay in receipt of the notice of rejection.
U.C.C. § 4A-506 governs all six instances under which Article 4A calls for a party to
pay interest as a consequence of some action or inaction taken with respect to a funds
transfer transaction. Id. § 4A-506 comment 1.
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acceptance, they may be subject to interest liability for failure to
execute a payment order when the sender has a withdrawable credit
balance sufficient to cover the order. 1° The rationale for awarding
interest, even without wrongdoing by the bank, is that the sender
is denied the use of his own money by the bank when he reasonably
expected that it would be used as a source of payment for the
desired transaction.105 In such a case, that is, when the sender does
not receive notice of the rejection on the execution date and the
sender's account does not bear interest, the bank will be required
to pay interest to the sender for the days that pass between the
execution date and either (i) the date the order is cancelled or (ii)
the date the sender learns of the rejection or receives notice of
rejection, whichever date comes first. 0 6 If the withdrawable credit
balance falls below the order amount, interest is accordingly re-
duced.107
Two final points should be made with respect to rejection of
payment orders. First, when a bank "suspends payments" by virtue
of (a) being closed by supervisory authorities, or (b) having a
public officer appointed to take it over, or (c) ceasing or refusing
to make payments in the ordinary course of business, then all
payment orders subsequently issued to that bank will be deemed
to have been rejected as of the time suspension of payments be-
gan. 08 In these times of current weakness and uncertainty in the
United States banking system, this provision will be of increasing
importance to funds transfer users nervous about the health of the
banks performing this vital service for them.
Second, rejection and acceptance are cast by Article 4A as
mutually exclusive payment order actions. °9 Once a bank rejects a
payment order, it may not later accept it without the consent of
the sender. 10 This consent would be accomplished by issuance of
a second payment order by the sender to replace the first, rejected,
payment order."' Once a payment order has been accepted, how-
ever, rejection becomes impossible." 2
10, See id. § 4A-210(b) & comment 3.
1o See id. § 4A-210 comment 3.
I- See id. § 4A-210(b).
107 See id.
o See id. § 4A-210(c) & comment 4; see also id. § 4-104(I)(k).
See id. § 4A-210(d) & comment 4.
1o Id. § 4A-210 comment 4.
i, See id.
112 See id.
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4. Cancellation and Amendment of the Payment Order
Occasionally, a sender may want to cancel or amend his pay-
ment order. The sender may have changed his mind about the
transaction, erroneously requested payment, transmitted multiple
requests for payment orders for the same obligation, or simply
requested the wrong amount in the payment order.113 Whatever the
case, the sender can rectify the problem by either amending his
order or simply cancelling it and issuing a new one to achieve the
desired result.11 4
A cancellation or amendment instruction may be transmitted
to the bank orally, electronically, or in writing, but if a "security
procedure" is in effect between the sender and the receiving bank,
the cancellation or amendment must be verified accordingly, unless
the bank agrees otherwise. 5 (For now it suffices to say that a
security procedure is an agreement between the sender and the
receiving bank by which payment orders and instructions can be
(i) authenticated as originating from the sender or (ii) checked for
errors.)116
Cancellation or amendment instructions must be received by
the bank within a reasonable time before acceptance in order for
the bank to have sufficient time to act, otherwise the instruction
will not be effective. 1 7 Instructions received after acceptance by
the receiving bank will only be effective if the bank agrees or the
applicable funds transfer system rules allow cancellation or amend-
ment without agreement by the bank." 8
There are two further requirements for cancellation or amend-
ment instructions to be effective after acceptance, one of which
applies to a receiving bank that is not the beneficiary's bank and
the other of which applies to a receiving bank that is also the
beneficiary's bank." 9 For a receiving bank other than the benefi-
"I See id. § 4A-211 comment I.
114 See id.
"1 See id. § 4A-211(a).
116 See id. § 4A-201. For an introductory discussion of security procedures, see infra
notes 254-58.
M See U.C.C. § 4A-211(b).
"I6 See id. § 4A-211(c); see also Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First American
Bank & Trust, 731 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1990). The court made reference to this rule of
no effective cancellation without agreement by the receiving bank or a funds transfer system
rule providing for effective cancellation or amendment without such agreement. See id. at
63. The citation made in the opinion, however, refers to an earlier draft of Article 4A. See
id. at 63.
- See U.C.C. § 4A-211(c).
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ciary's bank, the cancellation or amendment instruction will not
be effective unless a conforming cancellation or acceptance of the
payment order issued by the receiving bank is made. 120 This pro-
vision insulates the receiving bank from liability to an intermediary
or beneficiary bank in the event that the intermediary or beneficiary
bank to whom the receiving bank issued its payment order refuses
to consent to the cancellation or amendment, and the receiving
bank cannot rely on a funds transfer system rule to effect a
unilateral cancellation or amendment.121
For a receiving bank that is also the beneficiary's bank, can-
cellation or amendment instructions will not be effective unless all
parties to the transaction agree that they will be effective,'22 or
unless one of the following events has occurred: (i) the sender's
order was not authorized by the sender; (ii) the sender mistakenly
requested a duplicate of a previously issued payment order; (iii)
the payment order requests payment to a beneficiary not entitled
to payment from the originator; or (iv) the payment order requests
payment in excess of the amount that the beneficiary is entitled to
receive from the originator. 23
Cancellation of an unaccepted payment order may well occur
by operation of law, at the close of the fifth funds-transfer business
day after the execution date or payment date of the payment
order. 24 Such provision is intended to deal with the rare occasion
when a payment order was inadvertently not cancelled by the
sender. 125 To prevent the sender from unexpectedly having the
payment order accepted, after he assumed that it was cancelled,
the cancellation is made automatically under Article 4A after five
funds-transfer business days from the payment or execution date. 126
Cancelled payment orders cannot thereafter be accepted. 127 An
amendment is treated, at the time of amendment, as a simultaneous
1- See id. § 4A-211(c)(1).
121 See id. § 4A-211 comment 3.
2 See id. § 4A-211 comment 4.
123 See id. § 4A-211(c)(2) & comment 4 (providing four illustrative hypotheticals con-
cerning the cancellation or amendment of a payment order accepted by a beneficiary bank).
1- See id. § 4A-211(d).
125 See id. § 4A-211 comment 7.
- See id. This situation can arise when the sender initially lacked sufficient funds or
credit to cover his payment order or there were some problems with the terms of the order.
Delayed acceptance of this type of payment order would be unanticipated by the sender.
Thus, Article 4A makes cancellation a matter of operation of law. See id.
1- See id. § 4A-211(e).
1990-91]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
cancellation of the original payment order and issuance of a new
payment order. 128
The questions regarding losses, expenses, and attorneys' fees
are also addressed in Article 4A's treatment of the subject of
cancellation. 129 Unless a funds transfer system rule or the agreement
of the parties provides to the contrary, if the receiving bank agrees
to a post-acceptance cancellation or amendment or is bound to
allow post-acceptance cancellation or amendment by a funds trans-
fer system rule, the sender will be liable to the bank for losses or
expenses it incurs, including attorney's fees arising out of the
cancellation or amendment. 30 The sender will be liable regardless
of whether the cancellation or amendment is ultimately effective
or not.13 '
The death or legal incapacity of a sender will not operate as a
revocation of the payment order unless the bank has notice and a
reasonable opportunity to act before acceptance of the order. 32
Although the acceptance by a bank of a sender's payment order is
comparable to the acceptance of an offer in contract law, this
provision reverses the portion of the law of contracts that provides
that death or incapacity terminates an offer, even without an
offeree having notice. 133 The rule of Article 4A follows the rule for
checks found in Article 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 34
Article 4A is not explicit in its treatment of the effect that the
sender's bankruptcy has on a payment order not yet accepted. The
Supreme Court previously has held that the mere filing of invol-
untary bankruptcy by the customer of a bank is not sufficient to
operate as revocation of the bank's authority to honor the custo-
mer's checks. 35 Additionally, the federal Bankruptcy Code seems
to contemplate that a receiving bank that accepts a sender's pay-
ment order in ignorance of the bankruptcy filing of the sender is
128 See id.
" See id. § 4A-211(f).
13o See id.
131 See id.
112 See id. § 4A-211(g).
" See id. § 4A-211 comment 6; see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 48
(1979).
14 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(g) comment 6; id. § 4-405(1).
135 See Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 101-02 (1966). In England, the bank
honored checks drawn before, but presented for payment after, the voluntary bankruptcy
filing of the depositor. The Court held that without more, a mere filing of voluntary
bankruptcy by a depositor did not operate as a revocation of the bank's authority to honor
the checks of the depositor. Bankruptcy filing would not be construed as a per se notice to
the bank of revocation of authority to honor previously drawn checks.
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free to charge the sender's account for the amount of the payment
order. 3 6
Finally, to underscore the drafters' intended supremacy of Ar-
ticle 4A over inconsistent private agreements on payment order
cancellation, the Article provides that any funds transfer system
rule shall not be effective to the extent that it is in conflict with
Article 4A's provisions that allow cancellation after the beneficiary
bank has accepted, if certain criteria are met. 137 The rationale for
this provision is that while a funds transfer system rule is intended
to govern the rights and obligations between banks, reaching the
opposite result contemplated by Article 4A, such a rule may also
affect the rights of third parties in an unacceptable way.' 38 To
prevent such a funds transfer system rule from foreclosing a third
party sender's limited rights to cancellation after acceptance by the
beneficiary bank, the rule will be given no effect to the extent that
the sender's right to cancellation is abridged. 139
5. The Payment Obligation and Process
A discussion of the funds transfer process would not be com-
plete without an examination of Article 4A's treatment of the issues
of actual payment as they relate to a transaction's parties. Con-
ceptually, Article 4A discusses the issues of payment in two distinct
units: 1) the payment at the beginning of the process-by the sender
to the receiving bank;' 40 and 2) the payment at the end of the
process-by the beneficiary bank to the beneficiary. 141
a. Payment by the Sender to the Receiving Bank
i. Creation of the Obligation to Pay
The sender's obligation to pay the receiving bank is discussed
in two contexts. The first case is when the receiving bank is also
136 See U.C.C. § 4A-211 comment 6. The relevant provision of the Bankruptcy Code
is 11 U.S.C. § 542(c) (1988), which provides:
[A]n entity that has neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the com-
mencement of the case concerning the debtor may transfer property of the
estate, or pay a debt owing to the debtor, in good faith... to an entity other
than the trustee, with the same effect as to the entity making such transfer or
payment as if the case under this title... concerning the debtor had not been
commenced.
137 See U.C.C. § 4A-211(h); supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text (explaining the
sender's right to cancellation after acceptance by the beneficiary bank).
131 See U.C.C. § 4A-211 comment 8.
139 See id.
140 See id. §§ 4A-402 to 4A-403.
,41 See id. §§ 4A-404 to 4A-405.
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the beneficiary's bank and the second case is when the receiving
bank is one other than the beneficiary's bank.
When the sender is sending the payment order to the benefi-
ciary's bank, the sender is obliged to pay at the point at which the
beneficiary's bank accepts the order. 42 However, the payment will
not be due until the payment date of the order. 143 This provision
was drafted to cover cases when a beneficiary bank accepts a
payment order before the payment date (i.e., the beneficiary bank
notifies the beneficiary of receipt of the payment order and, by
doing so, accepts it before the payment date). 44 Thus, while the
oblightion to pay is created at the moment of acceptance, the
payment is not due until the payment date.145
If the sender issues a payment order to a bank other than the
beneficiary's bank, acceptance by the receiving bank will oblige
the sender to pay the full amount of the order to the receiving
bank. 1' Payment is not due, however, until the execution date of
the sender's order. 147 The sender's obligation will be excused if the
funds transfer process is not completed by the beneficiary bank's
acceptance of a payment order that instructs payment to the ben-
eficiary. 48 In this case, the funds transfer is said to have miscarried
and the sender, if he has already paid the receiving bank, will be
entitled to a refund of his payment with interest as provided under
Article 4A. 149
In the case of an intermediary bank suspending payments,
Article 4A creates protection for the parties involved.'Y0 Since the
funds transfer would not be accepted by the beneficiary bank in
such a case, the funds transfer would not be completed. The
originator, therefore, would not be obliged to pay the receiving
bank. '5 While the receiving bank would be entitled to a refund if
it paid the intermediary bank before the intermediary bank sus-
142 See id. § 4A-402(b).
143 See id.
I" See id. § 4A-402 comment 1. This problem often arises in the case of automated
clearing house transfers. See also supra notes 73-87 and accompanying text.
14, See U.C.C. § 4A-402 comment 1.
1- See id. § 4A-402(c).
147 See id.
18 See id.
"I See id. § 4A-402 comment 2; see also U.C.C. § 4A-506 (explaining Article 4A
interest calculation); infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text (discussing Article 4A's
refund feature).
110 See U.C.C. § 4A-402 comment 2.
i See id.
[VOL. 80
UCC ARTICLE 4A
pended payments, the intermediary could be insolvent and unable
to give the receiving bank its refund. Article 4A provides, therefore,
that if the originator instructed the receiving bank that the inter-
mediary bank was to be used, then the originator will be required
to reimburse the receiving bank for the amount paid to the inter-
mediary bank. By giving an explicit instruction to the receiving
bank that a specific intermediary is to be employed, the originator
takes the risk of that intermediary's insolvency. 52 The originator
will then have a subrogated claim against the insolvent intermedi-
ary.' 53 Neither the originator's right to have the payment obligation
excused in the event of nonacceptance by the beneficiary bank nor
the right to subrogation in the cases where his designated inter-
mediary bank suspends payments may be varied by agreement.154
ii. Time and Means of Payment by the Sender to the Receiving
Bank
If the sender of a payment order is a bank, payment occurs
when the receiving bank receives final settlement of the obligation
through the Federal Reserve Bank or through a funds transfer
system. 155 Payment orders between banks are settled in one of two
general ways. First, if the payment order is sent out on a network
other than that maintained by the Federal Reserve (Fedwire), the
amounts of various payment orders are credited and debited to
accounts of one bank at another or credited and debited through
a clearing house account. 1 6 Subsequent settlement is then achieved
through a Federal Reserve bank, which charges the accounts of all
net debtor banks and credits the accounts of all net creditor banks. 157
Second, if the payment order is sent out over Fedwire, a Federal
Reserve bank will debit and credit the appropriate banks at the
time the payment order is received by the receiving bank. 58 Under
both mechanisms, when the Federal Reserve settlement is finalized,
the sender's obligation is paid.
,,2 See id.; see also id. § 4A-402(e). For a fuller discussion of Article 4A's treatment
of the insolvency of an intermediary bank, see Nelson, Settlement Obligations and Bank
Insolvency, 45 Bus. LAw. 1473, 1476-77 (1990).
See U.C.C. § 4A-402(e).
See id. § 4A-402(f).
See id. § 4A-403(a)(1).
"6 See id. § 4A-403 comment 1.
See id.
See id.
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Some bank to bank payment obligations, however, are settled
outside the Federal Reserve System. 159 This is often the case with
foreign banks, which have no access to the Federal Reserve pay-
ment system.' 60 Payments must be made through accounts the
banks have with each other or with third banks. 161 Under this type
of payment regime, payment is effectuated (1) by the sender cred-
iting an account of the receiving bank and the credit subsequently
being withdrawn by the receiving bank or (2) at midnight on the
day the credit becomes withdrawable and the receiving bank learns
of it.162 This midnight provision is designed to allow the bank being
credited sufficient time to reject the payment order if it chooses,
thus avoiding acceptance and the resultant liability to the benefi-
ciary. 16
Payment can also be effectuated in other ways. The sender,
either a bank or non-bank, may have an account with the receiving
bank, allowing the receiving bank to effect payment by debiting
that account thereby discharging the sender's payment obligation.1
Payment by this means, however, is only possible to the extent a
withdrawable credit balance exists in the account being debited.1 65
A further means of achieving payment under Article 4A in-
volves those banks that are members of a funds transfer system
such as CHIPS.1 66 Such a system allows member banks to transmit
payment orders over the system, with settlement of all obligations
being made at the end of the day. 167 At that time, the aggregate
credits and debits of member banks are tabulated; Article 4A
payment results when each bank is given its net credit or debit
after all transactions have been processed. 168 Article 4A makes it
clear that this netting settlement under the applicable funds transfer
system rules is valid and not subject to common law attack based
on the theory that no mutuality of obligation exists. 169
1S9 See id. § 4A-403 comment 2.
160 See id.
161 See id.
I- See id. § 4A-403(a)(2).
163 See id. § 4A-403 comment 2.
164 See id. § 4A-403(a)(3) & comment 3.
1 See id.
- CHIPS is the acronym for the New York Clearing House Interbank Payment
Systems.
I67 See U.C.C. § 4A-403(b) & comment 4.
16s See id.
169 See id.
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A final apparatus for the payment of receiving banks under
Article 4A is the system whereby two banks have a mutual agree-
ment to settle their respective payment order obligations either
daily or periodically by setting off the amount owed by each bank
against the amount owed to it by the other.1 70 Payment occurs
when this setoff is made.171 It must be noted that the obligations
created by this scheme, and by the previously discussed CHIPS
type scheme, are obligations between the banks that do not involve
their respective customers. Thus, in case of a bank's insolvency,
any outstanding liability of the insolvent bank is measured in terms
of its net setoff position with the other bank or banks. 72
In the unlikely case that the sender does not have an account
relationship with the receiving bank or does not settle with the
Federal Reserve bank (e.g., a customer that pays for the payment
order by cash, check, or bank obligation), Article 4A does not
provide for when payment is effected. Payment time must then be
determined by reference to extrinsic law.17 3
b. Payment by the Beneficiary's Bank to the Beneficiary
i. Creation of the Obligation to Pay
In general, when the beneficiary's bank accepts the payment
order under Article 4A, it has an obligation to pay the beneficiary
of that order. 7 4 The payment is due on the payment date of the
order, but if acceptance occurs after the close of the beneficiary
bank's funds-transfer business day, payment is due on the next
funds-transfer business day.17 5 Most importantly, Article 4A pro-
vides that if the beneficiary bank refuses to pay after demand is
made by the beneficiary, and if the bank receives notice of partic-
ular facts that may give rise to consequential damages arising out
of nonpayment, the beneficiary will be able to recover those con-
sequential damages to the extent of the beneficiary's notice. 76 The
1-0 See id. § 4A-403(c).
1 See id.
17 See id. § 4A-403 comment 4.
17 See id. § 4A-403(d) & comment 5.
- See id. § 4A-404(a).
175 See id.
176 See id.
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beneficiary bank may escape liability with proof that it had rea-
sonable doubt as to beneficiary's right to payment. 77
It is crucial to understand that the beneficiary bank need not
have notice of the exact or even approximate amount of potential
consequential damages. It is sufficient that the bank have notice
of the general type or nature of the potential damages that the
beneficiary may suffer from nonpayment. 7 8 A case illustrating this
principle is Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.179 In Evra, the char-
terer of a ship sued a bank for failure to make timely payment,
which resulted in the cancellation of a charter. From a failure to
transmit $27,000 in a timely manner, the charter was claiming
consequential damages exceeding $2,000,000. The court held that
the bank had not been given notice of the special circumstances of
the funds transfer-that failure to consummate the $27,000 transfer
would result in this large sum of consequential damages. 80 Had
there been actual notice to the bank that consequential damages
of over $1,000,000 would result, the bank would have been put on
notice and been liable for the consequential damagesY.8
Also important is the concept of reasonable doubt as to the
beneficiary's right to payment. The presence of reasonable. doubt
is the beneficiary bank's defense to a consequential damage claim
by the beneficiary based on nonpayment. In the ordinary case, this
right of payment issue should be fairly clear since the bank should
know if it has accepted and thus obliged itself to pay. 8 2 In some
In See id. The drafters of the rule have recognized that the Expedited Funds Availa-
bility Act, codified at 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 4001-4010 (West 1989 & Supp. 1991), also governs
the issue of funds availability in a funds transfer such that this portion of Article 4A may
be subject to federal preemption. See U.C.C. § 4A-404 comment 1. The Expedited Funds
Availability Act (EFA Act) is federal consumer protection legislation intended to provide
bank customers with expedited access to their bank deposits. See Baxter & Bhala, supra
note 61, at 1488. The two statutes appear to be in conflict in some respects as a result of
their different orientation and purpose. In some cases, the EFA Act may not require a
beneficiary bank to pay the beneficiary until later than required under Article 4A, while in
others, the EFA Act would require payment earlier. The preemption issue, however, might
be averted by resort to the conflict of laws provision of the EFA Act. See id. at 1489-90.
The case law is not sufficiently developed on this point since only a handful of states have
adopted Article 4A as of this writing. Consequently final resolution of this issue will be
made at some point in the future.
179 See U.C.C. § 4A-404 comment 2.
17 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982).
110 See Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 956 (7th Cir. 1982). The Evra
court made reference to the time honored rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(Ex. Ch. 1854), in articulating its holding that liability for consequential damages is predi-
cated on the defendant being put on notice of the special circumstances giving rise to them.
'" U.C.C. § 4A-404 comment 2.
"1 See id. § 4A-404 comment 3.
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cases, however, it may not be entirely clear that acceptance has
occurred. When, for example, acceptance occurs by receipt of
payment by the beneficiary bank, some doubt may exist as to
whether payment was in fact received. 83 Also, a doubtful case may
arise when there is uncertainty that the person demanding payment
is in fact the beneficiary. 184
No reasonable doubt defense can be raised, however, when a
funds transfer is being used to pay an obligation and a dispute
subsequently arises between the originator and the beneficiary con-
cerning whether the obligation is in fact owed. 185 In this situation,
the grounds alleged by the originator as a defense to his payment
obligations to the beneficiary do not have any effect on the bene-
ficiary bank's duty to pay the beneficiary upon acceptance. 86 The
originator has no right to cancel a payment order to the benefi-
ciary's bank (except in those cases involving a "book transfer,"
which involves the originator and the beneficiary having the same
bank)'87 because the originator is not the sender of that payment
order. Instead, the receiving or intermediary bank is the sender,
and it alone retains the right of cancellation. 88 Article 4A further
emphasizes the centrality of the beneficiary's right to payment by
providing that it may not be varied by either agreement or by a
funds transfer system rule. 89
The beneficiary's bank's duty to notify the beneficiary of the
receipt of the payment order is also demarcated by Article 4A.
Ordinarily, when acceptance occurs by giving notice, 9' notice and
acceptance occur simultaneously; 191 when acceptance occurs under
any other means provided for under Article 4A, the beneficiary's
bank still must discharge its duty of notice to the beneficiary. 92 If
the payment order instructs payment to the beneficiary's account,
the beneficiary's bank must notify the beneficiary of receipt before
midnight of the next funds-transfer business day after receipt. 93 If
,83 See id.
,9 See id.
"I See id. An example is the case in which the originator is attempting to halt payment
to the beneficiary on the grounds of fraud or breach of contract.
'8 Id.
- See id.
' See id.
"8 See id. § 4A-404(c).
1 See id. § 4A-209(b)(1).
"9 See id. § 4A-404 comment 4.
,9z See id.
19, See id. § 4A-404(b).
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the payment order does not instruct payment to an account of the
beneficiary, notice to the beneficiary is only required if the order
so stipulates. 94 Notice can be given by first-class mail or any other
reasonable means under the circumstances. 95
Failure of the beneficiary's bank to give notice will oblige the
beneficiary's bank to pay interest on the payment order. Interest
accrues from the period when notice should have been given until
the beneficiary learns of the beneficiary's bank's receipt of the
payment order. 96 While damages other than interest are not recov-
erable, attorney's fees may be recovered if a demand for interest
is made and refused before legal action is commenced to recover
the interest.' 97
The beneficiary's right to notice, unlike the beneficiary's right
to payment, is subject to variation by agreement or by funds
transfer system rules, provided the beneficiary has notice of the
rule before the beginning of the funds transfer. 98 In automatic
clearing house transactions, it is customary not to give the bene-
ficiary notice unless it is requested. This practice obviously can be
continued by the adoption of a funds transfer system rule.' 99
ii. Time and Means of Payment by the Beneficiary's Bank to
the Beneficiary
If the beneficiary's bank credits the beneficiary's account with
the proceeds of the payment order, payment of the bank's obli-
gation occurs when and to the extent that (i) the beneficiary is
notified of his right to withdraw the credit, (ii) the bank lawfully
applies the credit to a debt of the beneficiary, or (iii) the proceeds
of the payment order are otherwise made available to the benefi-
ciary.20 On the other hand, if the beneficiary's bank does not
credit an account of the beneficiary, the time when payment occurs
is governed by principles of law outside Article 4A.20'
See id.
See id.
19 See id.
19 See id.
"I See id. § 4A-404(c) & comment 4.
"9 See id. § 4A-404 comment 4.
20 See id. § 4A-405(a). The principal cases in which a bank applies the payment order
proceeds to a beneficiary's debt are instances of setoff by the beneficiary's bank or
garnishment by a creditor of the beneficiary. See id. § 4A-405 comment 1; see also id. §
4A-502 comment 2.
201 See id. § 4A-405(b). In almost all cases the bank credits the account of the
beneficiary, so resort to extrinsic law to decide issues of payment should not be a common
occurrence. See id. § 4A-405 comment 1.
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In general, the beneficiary's bank cannot pay the beneficiary
and reserve a right to recover from the beneficiary should the
beneficiary bank not receive payment for the payment order. Such
a condition is unenforceable. 202 By paying the beneficiary before it
receives payment for the order, the beneficiary's bank assumes the
risk of nonpayment. 20 3 Thus, when the beneficiary's bank has paid
within the meaning of Article 4A by informing the beneficiary that
it may withdraw the credit, the beneficiary bank generally cannot
revoke the withdrawal right in the event that the bank is not paid. 204
This general rule, prohibiting the beneficiary bank's recovery
after payment is made, is subject to two exceptions under Article
4A. The first exception involves the case of a funds transfer system
rule providing that a payment made to a beneficiary through the
system is "provisional" until the beneficiary's bank is paid.205 In
such a case, the beneficiary's bank is entitled to a refund from the
beneficiary if (i) the rule requires both the beneficiary and origi-
nator to be given notice of the provisional nature of system pay-
ments before the transfer is initiated, (ii) the beneficiary, the
beneficiary's bank, and the originator's bank agree to abide by the
rule, and (iii) payment is not received by the beneficiary's bank.206
Thus, if the beneficiary is required to effect a refund to the
beneficiary's bank, the bank's acceptance will be nullified and no
payment to the beneficiary will have occurred. 20 7 Essentially, the
drafters designed this rule to cope with automated clearing house
transfers that handle transfers made in batches of payment orders
from different originators' banks. 208 In this scenario, funds are
customarily released to beneficiaries earlier than the payment date,
with the understanding that all payments are provisional until the
beneficiary's bank receives payment.2 9
The second exception to the general rule concerns funds trans-
fer system rules on loss-sharing.21 0 In any funds transfer system
202 See id. § 4A-405(c).
203 See id. § 4A-405 comment 2. This rule also applies when the funds are released to
the beneficiary as a "loan." See id.
See id.
-5 See id. § 4A-405(d).
See id.
See id.
"I See id. § 4A-405 comment 3; see also id. § 4A-206 comment 2.
21 See id. § 4A-405 comment 3. The comment provides an in-depth, explanatory
treatment of the intricacies of automated clearing house rules on provisional payments to
beneficiaries.
210 See id. § 4A-405(e).
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that (i) nets obligations multilaterally among participants and (ii)
has a loss-sharing rule that provides funds necessary to complete
the settlement of obligations of participants that do not otherwise
meet their settlement obligations, a beneficiary bank may recover
after it has paid its beneficiary. 21' Such a rule is in effect on the
CHIPS system. 21 2
In the unlikely event that CHIPS or any other system would
fail to settle according to its rule, Article 4A provides an alternative
route of recovery. 23 Article 4A provides that should this event
occur with respect to any payment order, the bank's acceptance
will be nullified, and the beneficiary bank will be entitled to recover
from the beneficiary. In addition, no payment by the originator to
the beneficiary will have occurred, and each sender in the funds
transfer of that payment order will be excused from its payment
obligations and entitled to a refund if it has already paid. 214
c. Discharge of Underlying Obligations From Payment by
Originator to Beneficiary
Under Article 4A, payment by the originator to the beneficiary
is accomplished by providing to the beneficiary the obligation of
the beneficiary's bank to pay. 215 When the beneficiary's bank ac-
cepts the payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary, the
obligation thus created in the beneficiary bank substitutes for the
obligation of the originator to the beneficiary. 21 6 Discharge of the
originator's obligation will not result, however, where (i) such mode
of payment is prohibited by the contract between the beneficiary
and originator, (ii) the beneficiary notifies the originator of the
refusal of payment within a reasonable time after receiving notice
from his bank of receipt of the order, (iii) funds from the order
were not withdrawn or applied to a debt of the beneficiary, and
(iv) the beneficiary would suffer a loss reasonably avoided by a
21 See id.
212 See id.
213 See id. According to CHIPS rules, if the system failed to settle, no bank would
receive settlement at all.
2,4 See id. § 4A-405 comment 4.
21 See id. § 4A-406 comment I.
216 See id. § 4A-406 comment 2. This effect is similar to that of the beneficiary
receiving a cashier's check payable to him under Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Once a holder procures a certified check, the drawer and all prior endorsers are
discharged. See id.; see also id. § 3-411(1).
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means of payment complying with the contract. 217 The rationale
for this rule of no discharge is to prevent the originator from
imposing the risk of any bank insolvency upon the beneficiary
when the beneficiary had requested other means of payment not
encompassing such a risk. 218 Where no discharge of the obligation
results under this rule, the originator is subrogated to the rights of
the beneficiary to receive payment from the beneficiary's bank.219
In the ordinary wire transfer transaction, charges are nominal
in relation to the amount of money being transferred. 20 Generally,
the parties to a wire transfer transaction agree in advance on how
the charges for the transfer service will be divided among them-
selves. 221 When the parties fail to agree on this point, however,
Article 4A provides a resolution. Article 4A allows the bank issuing
a payment order to deduct the charges for transmission from the
amount of the issued payment order. The beneficiary then receives
an amount from the payment order that reflects the amount owed
to him by the originator less the charges for transmission. 2n This
amount is deemed to be payment in the amount of the originator's
order and discharges the originator's underlying obligation to the
beneficiary, unless the beneficiary subsequently demands reim-
bursement for the transmission costs and the originator refuses.22
III. WHY ARTICLE 4A IS THE SOLUTION TO MANY UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS UNDER THE CURRENT LAW OF FUNDS TRANSFERS
The reader is now familiar with the scope of Article 4A, the
cast of Article 4A characters, and the inner workings of the Article
4A transfer process from start to finish.224 But these matters are
simply the preliminaries in terms of appreciating the real import
of Article 4A.225 These matters address themselves to the bulk of
funds transfer activity, which is executed without a hitch. However,
Article 4A's ultimate value must be assessed in terms of how it
217 See id. § 4A-406(b). Comments 3 and 4 to this section discuss some of the
permutations of this rule of no discharge and how it would work in practice.
211 See id. § 4A-406 comment 3.
219 See id. § 4A-406(b) & comment 3.
See id. § 4A-406 comment 5.
2' See id.
m See id.
223 See id. § 4A-406(c) & comment 5.
21 For a discussion, see supra Parts I & II of this Article.
225 U.C.C. §§ 4A-101 to 4A-507 (1990) (Uniform Commercial Code-Funds Transfers).
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handles those funds transfer transactions in which something goes
wrong, leaving uncertainty about all phases of liability.
Article 4A is precisely the sort of statutory scheme needed to
address these liability and liability-related issues. In the discussion
below, the reader will be introduced to potential liability issues
that can and do arise in the funds transfer arena and how Article
4A presents a cogent and effective response to those issues.
A. Choice of Law
Often, a threshold inquiry in the resolution of any liability
problem involves the applicable law by which the issue is to be
decided. The drafters of Article 4A were not content to leave this
potentially nettlesome issue to the courts without explicit statutory
guidance. 226 Since funds transfers are typically interstate or even
international in character, uncertainty in choice of law would make
predictability of legal outcomes extremely difficult.227 Therefore,
the drafters chose the following choice of law rule scheme to create
some order in what would otherwise be a chaos of conflicting and
overlapping law.
In the absence of a funds transfer system rule or contractual
agreement that operates as a choice of law provision, the rights
and obligations between the sender and the receiving bank are
governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the receiving bank
is located; the rights and obligations between the beneficiary's bank
and the beneficiary are governed by the law of the jurisdiction
where the beneficiary's bank is located; and, the issue of when
payment is made pursuant to a funds transfer is governed by the
law of the jurisdiction where the beneficiary's bank is located.22
The issues of when payment occurs are governed by the law of the
beneficiary's bank's jurisdiction since it is often difficult to ascer-
tain where the beneficiary is located. 229 It must be noted here,
however, that Article 4A has binding effect only on a jurisdiction
that has adopted it; its effect outside Article 4A jurisdictions is
limited to any court's willingness to apply it by analogyY0
21 See Baxter & Bhala, supra note 61, at 1502.
22, See U.C.C. § 4A-507 comment 1.
See id. § 4A-507(a)(1)-(3).
2" See id. § 4A-507 comment 2.
m See id.; Shawmut Worcester County Bank v. First American Bank & Trust, 731 F.
Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1990). In this case, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts was deciding a case that it had determined would be governed by Florida
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If, however, the parties to a funds transfer have made an
agreement selecting the applicable choice of law, that election will
govern the rights and liabilities of the parties despite the absence
of a reasonable relation between the transaction and the jurisdiction
whose law is stipulated.2' This provision increases the respect for
freedom of contract to a higher level than is apparent from the
position of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws.2 2 The
Restatement view requires either a "substantial relationship" be-
tween the jurisdiction whose law is selected and the transaction
involved, or, at least, some other reasonable basis for the choice
of the parties before a court will be bound to honor the choice of
law election.23 Moreover, the Restatement view allows a court to
disregard the choice of law election if it would result in a policy
outcome offensive to a jurisdiction other than the jurisdiction
selected by the parties . 4 The Article 4A choice of law framework
is more akin to the view expressed by the California and New York
state legislatures. That view accords more deference to the choice
of law preferences expressed in the parties' contract.35
Article 4A also recognizes that a funds transfer system rule
may serve as a choice of law provision.26 A funds-transfer system
rule may be fashioned to govern either (i) the rights and obligations
between participating banks with respect to payment orders in the
system, or (ii) the rights and obligations of some or all parties to
a funds transfer effected by the system. 237 The choice of law
provision that purports to bind all participating banks is indeed
binding upon them. The binding effect of the second type of funds
transfer system choice of law rule, however, depends upon notice. 238
While this second type of clause is binding upon the originator or
other sender, it will only be binding upon a receiving bank where
law, but the court was faced with no directly applicable Florida precedent on the issue of
wire funds transferred to the wrong account. The court decided to apply Article 4A by
analogy even though the statute was not in force in Florida. See id. at 63.
-' See U.C.C. § 4A-507 comment 3.
212 See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a) (1971).
2 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a).
See id. § 187(2)(b).
23 See U.C.C. § 4A-507 comment 3; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1646.5 (West Supp. 1991)
(stating that transactions over $250,000 are to be governed by California law if parties so
elect even if California bears no relation to the transaction); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
1401 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (parties may elect to have N.Y. law govern any transaction
over $250,000 whether or not N.Y. bears a relation to the transaction).
236 See U.C.C. § 4A-507(c).
-" See id.
23 See id.
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it has notice (a) that the particular funds transfer system may be
used in the transaction and (b) of the choice of law of the system,
at the time when the originator, other sender, or receiving bank
issued or accepted a payment order.239 The beneficiary will be
bound by the choice of law election of the funds transfer system
only if, at the time the transfer is initiated, the beneficiary has
notice of the possible use of the funds transfer system in the
transaction. In addition, the beneficiary must have notice of that
system's choice of law election.m As with the contractually chosen
choice of law discussed above, the funds transfer system's choice
of law applies notwithstanding the lack of reasonable relation
between the jurisdiction and the transaction.241
Deference to the funds transfer system's choice of law rule is
important because it allows the uniformity of law required to
operate an efficient system.24 2 Such a rule enables the system to
dispense with the myriad individual agreements on choice of law
and cover those cases in which private choice of law agreements
are not feasible.32 The drafters of Article 4A recognized the prob-
ability that funds transfer systems would exercise their right to
establish a unitary choice of law regime, increasing the certainty
of the transactions that they process.2"
The drafters foresaw, as well, possible conflicts between the
unitary regime and the parties' freedom to contract. In cases con-
taining a private contractual agreement on choice of law and a
funds transfer system choice of law rule that conflict, the private
contractual choice of law provision will prevail.245
Finally, when a funds transfer is carried out over more than
one funds transfer system, and an inconsistency exists between the
systems' choice of law rules, the governing law will be that of the
jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the matter in
issue.3 Under this fact pattern, courts will have their greatest
discretion in selecting the choice of law based on usual choice of
law analysis.
239 See id.
= See id.
241 See id.
22 See id. § 4A-507 comment 4.
241 See id.
2" See id.
-, See id. § 4A-507(d).
See id. § 4A-507(e).
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In considering choice of law under Article 4A, the point to
remember is that choice of law outcomes under Article 4A are to
a large extent malleable. The parties themselves can choose, by
their action or by design, whether they want Article 4A to apply
to their transaction.2 7
B. Injunctive Relief Under Article 4A
Another threshold issue in any liability problem is the scope of
relief offered to the parties. In addition to the damage remedies
previously mentioned in this commentary under Article 4A, the
question of available injunctive relief may arise.
Article 4A addresses this issue, recognizing that in the proper
circumstances, injunctive relief may be sought and granted without
offense to the purposes for which Article 4A was enacted. 248 Article
4A provides that for proper cause and in compliance with appli-
cable law a court may restrain (i) a person from issuing a payment
order to initiate a funds transfer, (ii) an originator's bank from
executing the payment order of the originator, and (iii) the bene-
ficiary's bank from releasing funds to the beneficiary or the ben-
eficiary from withdrawing the funds credited to his account. 49 An
injunctive scheme such as this gives courts the power to halt a
funds transfer even after it is set in motion.250
This injunctive power is limited, however. No injunction may
be obtained respecting any funds transfer other than those men-
tioned.2' Furthermore, intermediary banks are immune from in-
junctive relief, and injunctive relief against the originator and the
originator's bank is limited to the issuance of the payment order. 252
No one except the beneficiary's bank may be enjoined from paying
a payment order, and no receiving bank can be enjoined from
receiving the payment it is due from the sender of an order it has
accepted.32
In light of these limitations, it may be inferred from the text
of Article 4A that although the drafters did not see injunctive relief
as wholly incompatible with the operation of the statute, they saw
2,7 See Baxter & Bhala, supra note 61, at 1504.
See U.C.C. § 4A-503.
2A9 See id.
11 See id. § 4A-503 comment.
25 See id.
2 See id.
23 See id.
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such application as appropriately confined to a limited number of
cases.
C. Unauthorized Payment Orders
Given the enormous amount of money moved around the coun-
try and internationally each day by funds transfer activity, it is no
surprise that all parties involved have justifiable anxieties about
the potential for fraudulent and criminal activity. Article 4A spe-
cifically addresses the question of what is to be done both to (a)
prevent unauthorized use of customer accounts, which could cost
funds transfer parties millions of dollars before discovery of such
use, and (b) place legal responsibility for unauthorized use on the
appropriate parties.
1. Prevention of Unauthorized Use
To guard against the unauthorized use of payment orders,
Article 4A first introduces the concept of a "security procedure."
Article 4A defines a security procedure as a means agreed upon
by the customer and the receiving bank for the purposes of (i)
verifying that a payment order or instruction is that of the customer
or (ii) detecting error in the transmission or content of the payment
order or instruction.2 4 Security procedures may entail the use of
algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryp-
tion, callback procedures, or other similar security devices .2 5 No-
tably, Article 4A states that comparison of a signature with an
authorized signature specimen is not by itself a security proce-
dure .2 6 Also not a security procedure within the meaning of Article
4A is any procedure unilaterally adopted by the receiving bank.2 7
Use of security procedures is not mandated by Article 4A. The
liability rules for unauthorized funds transfers were drafted with
built-in incentives for banks and their customers to enter into
security procedure agreements.25 8
See U.C.C. § 4A-201.
25 See id.
See id.
217 See id. § 4A-201 comment.
21 See French, Unauthorized and Erroneous Payment Orders, 45 Bus. LAW. 1425,
1427 (1990).
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2. Liability Rules for Unauthorized Payment Orders
a. No Security Procedure
In the absence of a security procedure agreement in effect
between the sender and the receiving bank, any payment order
received by a receiving bank will be deemed the authorized order
of the person identified by the order as the sender if that person
authorized it or that person is otherwise bound by agency law.259
Therefore, if, for example, a receiving bank executed a payment
order and the sender refuses to pay, alleging that the payment
order was unauthorized, and no security procedure was in effect,
the receiving bank must resort to agency law principles of actual
or apparent authority or the equitable principles of subrogation or
restitution to establish its right to recover. 260
In most cases, however, these legal principles offer the receiving
banks little protection against losses. 261 Prudent banks simply are
not willing to gamble that they can recover in this manner. 262 With
the large amounts of money being transferred, the potential for
loss makes banks seek the assurance and protection that Article
4A affords to them through a security agreement with their pay-
ment order customers. 263
b. Effect of a Security Procedure
When the receiving bank and the customer have entered into
an agreement to establish a security procedure, the bank gains a
certain level of protection under Article 4A. 264 If a security agree-
ment is in effect, a payment order will be effective as the order of
the customer (and the bank will be entitled to enforce it) regardless
of any agency law based defense of lack of authority, if two
conditions are met: (i) the security procedure is a commercially
reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized pay-
ment orders, and (ii) the bank proves that it accepted the payment
-9 See U.C.C. § 4A-202(a).
'O See id. § 4A-203 comment 1. The comment contains a hypothetical illustration of
how agency law could allow the receiving bank to recover on either an estoppel or negligence
theory. For an illustration of a receiving bank's ability to recover in subrogation, see Gatoil
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. Forest Hill State Bank, 104 F.R.D. 580 (D. Md. 1986).
-1 See U.C.C. § 4A-203 comment I.
See id.
See id.
26 See id. § 4A-202(b).
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order in good faith and in compliance with the security procedure
as well as any written agreement or instruction of the customer
that restricts the acceptance of payment orders issued under the
customer's name.265 The bank will not be required to follow any
instruction from the customer that contravenes a written agreement
or does not arrive with sufficient time to give the bank a reasonable
opportunity to act on it.26
The above rules follow from the drafters' assumption that a
commercially reasonable security procedure is the best means of
avoiding any problems of unauthorized payment orders. 267 Protec-
tions are thus afforded to both the customer and the receiving
bank in order to encourage the use of security procedures.2 68
c. Commercial Reasonableness
The customer is protected by the requirement that any security
procedure adopted be commercially reasonable. This rule places on
the bank the burden of making commercially reasonable security
procedures available to its customers because the banks are in the
better position to evaluate the efficacy of a given procedure in
combatting fraud. 269 The customer, in contradistinction, has the
burden of supervising its employees to assure compliance with the
agreed to security procedure and of safeguarding both information
on security procedures and access to facilities for transmitting
payment orders and instructions.270
Of course, whenever the drafters of a statute use the words
"commercially reasonable" as a standard for predicating liability
upon a party, an inevitable definitional controversy arises. In using
these words, the drafters intended a flexible definition that would
be suited to the great variety that exists within the funds transfer
arena in terms of (1) labor and equipment costs for verification;
(2) customer needs in terms of volume of payment orders sent and
dollar amounts involved; (3) the type of bank acting as a receiving
bank; (4) the types of payment order involved; and (5) the partic-
ular modes of transmission.2 71
26 See id.
See id.
27 See id. § 4A-203 comment 3.
See id.
20 See id.
270 See id.
27 See id. § 4A-203 comment 4.
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Article 4A puts the issue of commercial reasonableness in the
hands of the trial judge by declaring that the issue is a question
of law. 272 The judge is directed, under Article 4A, to consider the
following factors in assessing commercial reasonableness: (1) the
wishes of the customer expressed to the bank; (2) the circumstances
of the customer known to the bank, including the size, type, and
frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to
the bank; (3) alternative security procedures offered to the cus-
tomer; and (4) security procedures in general use by customers and
receiving banks similarly situated.273
The drafters chose to make the issue of commercial reasona-
bleness a question of law since such questions are more susceptible
to predictability than questions of fact. Thus, from an analysis of
decisions, banks could reasonably anticipate whether their security
procedures would pass judicial muster. 274
The standard for the judge's decision should not be whether
another security procedure would have been better than the one
chosen; rather, the decision should focus on whether the procedure
arrived at was a reasonable one given the customer and bank
involved. 275 However, a security procedure falling below the appli-
cable prevailing standards of good banking practice should not be
considered commercially reasonable. 276
A security procedure can also be deemed commercially reason-
able by operation of Article 4A. Under the statute, a security
procedure will be deemed commercially reasonable where (i) it was
chosen by the customer after the bank offered and the customer
rejected a security procedure that was commercially reasonable for
that customer, and (ii) the customer expressly agreed in writing to
be bound by any payment order, authorized or not, issued in its
name and accepted in compliance with the security procedure cho-
sen by the customer. 27 7 The customer, then, may assume the risk
of his own bad decision by choosing a security procedure not
"I See id.
-3 See id. § 4A-202(b). This multi-factor calculus for arriving at a determination of
commercial reasonableness would seem to require at least an initial factual determination
on some issues (e.g., what procedures were in fact offered to the customer?). A court
conceivably might turn these fact-bound issues over to a jury while appropriately reserving
for itself the ultimate legal issue of commercial reasonableness. See French, supra note 258,
at 1431.
211 See U.C.C. § 4A-203 comment 4.
vI See id.
276 See id.
27 See id. § 4A-202(c).
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recommended by the bank.278 Thus counsel for funds transfer
customers should be aware of the "trap" Article 4A has created
for those that wish to second-guess the advice of the bank on
security procedure.279
d. Acceptance in Good Faith and in Compliance with the
Agreements
For a receiving bank to enforce a payment order through means
of an agreed-upon security procedure, not only must it demonstrate
the commercial reasonableness of the procedure, the bank must
also show that it accepted the disputed payment order in good
faith and in compliance with both the security agreement and any
other written agreement or instructions from the customer that
restrict the power of the bank to accept payment order requests
under the customer's name.280 The written agreement or instructions
might be given to limit acceptance to (1) payment orders payable
from an authorized account, (2) payment orders within an accounts
credit balance, or (3) payment orders to authorized beneficiaries.28
Good faith is defined by Article 4A as "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair deal-
ing. "282 This definition differs from the blanket definition of good
faith applicable to the rest of the Uniform Commercial Code,
which characterizes good faith as simply "honesty in fact in the
conduct or transaction concerned." 283 Thus, the drafters of Article
4A apparently wanted to stress that good faith, as it relates to
funds tranfers, would be construed in the light of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.284
278 See id. § 4A-203 comment 4.
21 See Patrikis, Baxter & Bhala, Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and
the Role of Counsel, 23 U.C.C. L.J. 219, 235-36 (1991). The authors opine that counsel
for customers might be led into this trap by counsel for banks. The bank's counsel could
offer a highly complex and expensive security procedure, knowing that it will be rejected.
This would lead the customer to choose another one, sign the' requisite written agreement,
and assume all risks of its failure.
See U.C.C. § 4A-202(b).
21, See id. § 4A-203 comment 3. These instructions limiting acceptance might be
incorporated into the security procedure itself instead of contained in a separate written
agreement or instruction. In any case the duty of the bank to comply with them is the
same. See id.
22 See id. § 4A-105(a)(6).
-3 See id. § 1-201(19).
4 See French, supra note 258, at 1435.
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e. Unenforceability of Some Verified Payment Orders
Notwithstanding the fact that a receiving bank has complied
with all of the Article 4A requirements for security procedure
agreements, some disputed payment orders that have been duly
verified under a commercially reasonable security procedure may
still be unenforceable.2 85 This unenforceability may arise in two
ways. First, the receiving bank may, by express written agreement,
limit the extent to which it is entitled to enforce or retain payment
of the payment order.2 6 In this manner a receiving bank assumes
all risk of loss with respect to unauthorized payment orders, even
though its security procedure and concomitant actions were per-
fectly within the bounds of Article 4A. 287
Second, the payment order may be unenforceable, notwith-
standing compliance with a commercially reasonable security pro-
cedure, if the following condition is met. The customer must prove
that the order was not caused either directly or indirectly by a
person that (i) was entrusted at any time with the duty to act for
the customer with respect to payment orders and instructions, or
(ii) obtained access to transmitting facilities of the customer, or
that obtained from a source controlled by the customer and without
authority of the receiving bank, information facilitating breach of
the security procedure, regardless of how the information was
obtained or whether the customer was at fault. 288 Information
includes any access device, computer software, or similar me-
dium.289
The customer can thus shift the risk of loss caused by unau-
thorized payment orders back to the receiving bank when it can
"prove" that the means used by the unauthorized person were not
obtained through the customer, through any of the customer's
present or former agents, or any other source controlled by the
customer. 290 "Prove," as defined under Article 4A, means to meet
the burden of establishing a fact by persuading the trier of fact
that the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-exis-
tence.29' In any situation involving unauthorized access to payment
-1 See U.C.C. § 4A-203.
u6 See id. § 4A-203(a)(1).
n7 See id. § 4A-203 comment 6.
See id. § 4A-203(a)(2).
See id.
See id. § 4A-203 comment 5.
291 Id.; see id. § 4A-105(a)(7). Article 4A incorporates the general Uniform Commercial
Code definition of "prove." See id. § 1-201(8).
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order information or facilities, bank regulations will require a
thorough criminal investigation, as an internal bank investigation,
and perhaps even an investigation by bank examiners. 292 The cus-
tomer will have access to all of the evidence produced by these
investigations to assist it in meeting its burden of proof.293
f. Variation of Rights and Obligations by Funds Transfer
System Rule
Article 4A does not prohibit a funds transfer system rule from
varying the rights and obligations of banks that are participating
members in the system with respect to unauthorized payment orders
or instructions. 294 A funds transfer system rule may operate to
allocate losses, due to unauthorized payment orders, between par-
ticipating banks in a manner inconsistent with Article 4A. 295 How-
ever, a funds transfer system rule may not directly or indirectly
affect the rights of a customer that is not a participating bank in
the funds transfer system. 29 6
g. Refunds to Customer and Customer's Duty to Report with
Respect to Unauthorized Payment Orders
When, in unauthorized payment situations, (i) no commercially
reasonable security procedure was in effect, (ii) the bank did not
comply with a commercially reasonable security procedure that was
in effect, (iii) the customer can prove that the culprit did not gain
confidential security information controlled by the customer, or
(iv) the bank had made an agreement to take all or part of the
loss of unauthorized payment orders, the bank comes under a duty
to refund to the customer any amount under the payment order
that it is not entitled to enforce for any of the above-stated rea-
sons .
297
Moreover, the bank may also be responsible for interest on the
refunded amount. This amount is calculated from the date the
292 See id. § 4A-203 comment 5.
291 See id.
21 See id. § 4A-202(f); id. § 4A-203 comment 7.
19 See id. § 4A-203 comment 7.
See id. § 4A-501(b) & comment 1. Although Article 4A would permit funds transfer
system rules to affect the rights of non-participants in other contexts indirectly, such effects
concerning unauthorized payment order rights and obligations would probably not be
permitted. See French, supra note 258, at 1441-42.
2" See U.C.C. § 4A-204(a) & comment 1.
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bank received payment to the date the refund is made.298 This
interest obligation, however, is conditioned on the customer (1)
exercising ordinary care in determining that the order was not
authorized by the customer and (2) notifying the bank of the
relevant facts within a reasonable time, not exceeding 90 days from
the time the customer received notice from the bank of the order
being accepted or of its account being debited for the order. 299
Failure of these conditions will lead only to no interest recovery
by the customer; it will not result in any recovery by the bank
from the customer.30
The purpose of this provision is to induce customers to notify
the receiving bank promptly of any unauthorized payment order.30'
Prompt reporting will sometimes allow the bank to recover the
money from the culprit of the fraud. Thus, the interest that the
customer loses for failure to report unauthorized payment orders
promptly acts as an incentive to report.3 02
"Reasonable time" will depend on the facts of each case, but
in no event will reasonable time be construed as beyond 90 days
from the notice to the customer of acceptance or debit to its
account. 30 3 Within that 90 day parameter, reasonable time may be
fixed by agreement of the parties. The obligation to refund, how-
ever, is not subject to variation by agreement. 3 4
D. Liability Rules for Erroneous Payment Orders and
Erroneous Instructions by the Sender
Apart from the issue of liability for unauthorized payment
order activity, there is a further question of liability for errors in
the content or transmission of payment orders and payment order
instructions from the sender to the receiving bank. Article 4A
provides explicit guidance in this area.30 5
When a payment order (i) erroneously instructs payment to an
unintended beneficiary, (ii) erroneously instructs payment in a
greater amount than intended, or (iii) is an unintentional duplicate
2 See id. § 4A-204(a). The interest is to be calculated pursuant to the Article 4A
formula described in U.C.C. § 4A-506. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See U.C.C. § 4A-204(a).
See id.
30, See id. § 4A-204 comment 2.
See id.
3 See id.
See id. § 4A-204(b).
' See id. § 4A-205.
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of a previously sent payment order, the sender may be able to
escape liability on the order.30 6 This escape from payment order
liability is available to only those senders that have entered into
commercially reasonable security procedure agreements with the
receiving bank. 07 Security procedures are designed not only to
prevent unauthorized payment order activity but also to prevent
losses due to errors in the content or transmission of a payment
order.3 08
If the sender can prove that it or a person acting on its behalf'09
complied with an applicable security procedure and that the error
would have been detected had the receiving bank also complied,
the sender will not be obligated by the payment order.310 A recent
case illustrating this principle is Shawmut Worcester County Bank
v. First American Bank & Trust.311 In Shawmut, the sender bank
filed suit against the receiving bank when the receiving btnk refused
to refund its money after the sender discovered that the payment
order it sent to the receiving bank erroneously asked it to credit
the account of a party other than the intended beneficiary. Having
determined that Florida law should govern the case, but finding
no applicable precedent governing wire transfers, the court decided
to apply Article 4A by analogy. 3 2 The court held that since the
sending bank had not proven that the error would have been
detected if the receiving bank had complied with the security pro-
cedure, the sending bank would not be allowed to shift the risk of
loss flowing from the error to the receiving bank. 31 3
Assuming proper proof, in cases involving payment of an un-
intended beneficiary or duplicate payment orders, the sender is not
obliged to pay anything and the receiving bank must look for
recovery from the beneficiary under the law of mistake and resti-
tution.31 4 In cases involving payment orders instructing payment
greater than the amount intended, the sender will not be obliged
3 See id. § 4A-205 comment 1.
See id.; supra notes 254-84.
m See U.C.C. § 4A-205 comment 1; id. § 4A-201. Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 4A-205
describes how security procedures may be designed to prevent each of these types of errors.
" The "person acting on behalf of the sender" refers to a fund transfer system or
other third party communications system that transmits payment orders as defined in U.C.C.
§ 4A-206(a).
3,0 See id. § 4A-205(a)(1).
3,, 731 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1990).
3,2 See id. at 62-63.
3,3 See id. at 64.
31, See U.C.C. § 4A-205(a)(2).
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to pay any amount over the intended amount. 315 Again, the excess
must be recovered by the receiving bank from the beneficiary
through the law of mistake and restitution. 316 The rationale for
allowing this loss to shift from the sender to the receiving bank,
despite the sender's negligence, is the common law notion of last
clear chance, found in tort law. 317 Thus, if the receiving bank had
the final opportunity to act reasonably and accordingly avoid the
loss, it will be the party that suffers the risk of loss.
Despite the shift of risk of loss from the sender to the receiving
bank, the receiving bank may have an opportunity to recover from
the sender if the sender failed to exercise reasonable care in dis-
covering and informing the receiving bank of the error.318 If the
sender of an erroneous payment order is not obliged to pay for an
erroneous payment order by operation of the above-discussed rules,
and if the sender receives notice of that order being accepted by
the bank or notice of its account being debited to pay for the
order, the sender comes under this duty of reasonable care to
discover the error and inform the bank.31 9 This duty requires the
sender to exercise ordinary care, on the basis of the information
available to it, to discover the error in the order and advise the
bank of the relevant facts within a reasonable time, which shall
not exceed 90 days from the date of notice of acceptance or account
debit. 320 If the receiving bank can prove that the sender failed in
the exercise of this duty, the receiving bank may recover any losses
incurred as a result of that failure, up to the amount of the
payment order. 32' Where timely notice would not have made any
difference in the resulting losses to the bank, no recovery by the
bank from the sender is allowed. 322 The same last clear chance
theory that allowed the sender to shift the risk of loss to the
receiving bank for its noncompliance with the security procedure
will also allow the receiving bank to shift the loss back to the
sender for failure to give timely notice. 23
31 See id. § 4A-205(a)(3).
316 See id.
317 See id. § 4A-205 comment 2.
31, See id. § 4A-205(b).
319 See Id.
311 See id. The sender has a duty to act on the information available to it, so a receiving
bank might trigger a higher duty of care for the sender by supplying as much relevant
information as possible in its notice of acceptance or account debit. See French, supra note
258, at 1445.
322 See U.C.C. § 4A-205(b).
32 See id. § 4A-205 comment 2.
323 See id.
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The rights and obligations of the parties with respect to erro-
neous payment orders and payment order instructions are subject
to variation by agreement.3 24 These rights and obligations are not
among those that Article 4A treats as inviolable by funds transfer
system rule or other private agreement.
E. Liability for Losses from Misdescription of the Beneficiary
1. Types of Misdescription Covered
An additional problem area for funds transfer participants is
the problem of liability for losses resulting from a payment order
that either (1) directs payment to a non-existent or unidentifiable
person or account or (2) identifies a beneficiary by name and
account number when the name and account number refer to
different entities. Article 4A provides a liability scheme for losses
arising from both of these fact patterns. 325
2. Rights of the Parties in the Case of Misdescription
In the non-existent or unidentifiable person scenario, Article
4A provides that no person shall have any rights in that payment
order and acceptance of that order cannot occur.326 Each sender in
the funds transfer transaction will be entitled to get its moiey back
in this case. 327
In contrast, in the case of a mismatched name and account
number, there are payment order rights created. In such a case,
when the bank is not aware that the name and account number
refer to different persons, the beneficiary's bank is free to rely on
the account number as the proper identification of the beneficiary
to be paid. 328 The beneficiary's bank is under no duty to discover
the mismatch between the name and the account number. 329 If,
however, the beneficiary bank is aware of the difference between
the person identified by name and the person identified by account
number, no person will have rights except the person paid by the
beneficiary's bank if that person was entitled to payment from the
32 See id. § 4A-205 comment 3.
3- See id. § 4A-207.
3- See id. § 4A-207(a).
327 See id. § 4A-207 comment 1.
3- See id. § 4A-207(b)(1).
329 See id.
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originator of the funds transfer.330 If no person has rights as a
beneficiary, acceptance cannot occur. 331
The impetus for these rules is the automated means by which
many banks process payment orders, using a machine that identifies
the beneficiary by the account number indicated in the payment
order. 332 Such a system allows payment orders to be processed very
quickly and without the attendant risk of clerical error that accom-
panies manual handling of such transactions. 333 If banks were
required to verify that the account number on every payment order
corresponds to the name of the beneficiary on the payment order,
the additional expense and added potential for human error would
destroy the efficiency of the automated handling system. 334 Thus,
beneficiary banks are allowed to pay to the account number when
they do not know of the discrepancy between that number and the
name on the payment order. If beneficiary banks do know of the
mismatch, however, only the person paid by the beneficiary's bank
has rights in that payment order, and then only if he is entitled to
payment from the originator of the funds transfer.
The "knowledge" of the beneficiary bank will be construed in
light of general Uniform Commercial Code definition of when a
person has knowledge of information received by an organiza-
tion. 33. Under this rule, notice of information received by an or-
ganization will be effective for a particular transaction when it is
brought to the attention of the particular individual conducting the
transaction "and in any event from the time when it would have
been brought to his attention if the organization had exercised due
diligence. ' 36 Since Article 4A stipulates that the beneficiary bank
need not discover a discrepancy between the account number and
the name on the payment order, the question of due diligence
should not be an issue. The beneficiary bank should be deemed to
know of the discrepancy only if it is brought to the attention of
the person conducting the payment order transactions.
3- See id. § 4A-207(b)(2).
331 See id.
332 See id. § 4A-207 comment 2.
333 See id.
334 See id. It should be noted, however, that U.C.C. § 4A-207 also applies to banks
that use non-automated processing. Thus, even when payment orders are handled manually,
the beneficiary's bank is entitled to rely on the account number as accurately identifying
the beneficiary to be paid.
3 See id. § 1-201(27).
36 Id.
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3. Liability of the Originator
When the beneficiary's bank was unaware of a discrepancy
between the name and account number on a payment order, and
it pays to the account number, the originator may or may not be
obligated to pay its order. If the originator is a bank, it will be
liable on its order, since banks are fully aware of how payment
orders are processed and should have made certain that the name
and account number identified the same person. 337 If the originator
was not a bank, and it proves that the person identified by number
was not entitled to receive payment from the originator, the orig-
inator will not be obliged to pay for its order unless the originator's
bank proves that the originator had notice (prior to acceptance) of
the possibility that the beneficiary's bank would pay to the account
number without checking it against the name on the payment
order. 338 This proof may be accomplished by any admissible evi-
dence. 339 The burden of proof is satisfied by the originator's bank
if the originator, before acceptance, signs a writing stating that it
has notice of the possibility of the beneficiary bank paying directly
to the account number without a cross-check against the name on
the payment order. 340
4. Recovery by the Originator/Originator's Bank
If a beneficiary's bank is unaware of the discrepancy between
the name and account number on a payment order, and it pays to
the account number of a person not entitled to receive payment
from the originator, the originator, or its bank, may recover from
that person under the law of mistake and restitution, according to
the following rules: (1) if the originator (bank or non-bank) is
required to pay its payment order, then it has the right to recover
from the person paid by the beneficiary's bank; (2) if the originator
is not a bank and is not obliged to pay its payment order, the
originator's bank will be allowed to seek such recovery from that
person. 341
33 See id. § 4A-207(c)(1) & comment 3.
338 See id. § 4A-207(c)(2).
339 See id.
w See id. Such a writing also will act as notice for any payment order accepted by
the bank thereafter. See id. § 4A-207 comment 3.
341 See id. § 4A-207(d) & comment 3. Comments 2 and 3 to this section contain an
extensive hypothetical illustration of how these rules governing misdescription of the bene-
ficiary might play themselves out in terms of liability and recovery.
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5. The Need for Rules to Govern Misdescription
The pre-Article 4A case law is unclear on the issue of a bene-
ficiary bank's responsibility in carrying out a payment order when
the name and account number do not correspond to each other. 42
Two cases illustrating this conflict are Bradford Trust Co. v. Texas
American Bank343 and Securities Fund Services, Inc. v. American
National Bank.344
In Bradford Trust, the trust company brought action against a
bank for reimbursement after the trust company wired funds to
the bank and the bank erroneously credited the account specified
without verifying that it matched up with the name. The court held
in that case that the bank would not be responsible for the losses
of the trust company even though the bank may have been negli-
gent in not verifying that the account number matched the name
on the wire transfer order. The court concluded that since the trust
company's own negligence in not catching the discrepancy was the
primary cause of the loss, the trust company should bear the loss. 345
The plaintiff in Securities Fund Services brought suit against
the defendant bank to recover funds that were wired by plaintiff
to defendant. In this case, as in Bradford Trust, the bank credited
the relevant account number without checking to see if it matched
up with the name. However, the Securities Fund Services court
held that the plaintiff could recover from the bank on a negligence
theory for the bank's failure to verify that the account number
and the name referred to the same person.346
Article 4A has resolved this conflict in the case law. In the case
of misdescription of the beneficiary by a mismatched name and
account number, the beneficiary's bank is free to rely on the
account number so long as it does not "know" of the discrepancy
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code. Only when
such knowledge is shown may the originator of the funds transfer
recover from the beneficiary's bank. It is just this type of uncer-
tainty in the law of funds transfers that Article 4A is appropriately
geared to address.
', See id. § 4A-207 comment 2.
790 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1986).
144 542 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
'4 See Bradford Trust Co. v. American Texas Bank, 790 F.2d 407, 411 (5th Cir.
1986).
'1 See Securities Fund Serv., Inc. v. American Nat'I Bank, 542 F. Supp. 323, 327
(N.D. Ill. 1982).
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F. Liability for Losses from Misdescription of an Intermediary
Bank or Beneficiary's Bank
Fund transfer users may also realize losses from a payment
order that misdescribes an intermediary bank to be used or mis-
describes the beneficiary's bank. Two types of such misdescription
are contemplated by Article 4A in its liability rules: (1) the payment
order identifies the intermediary bank or beneficiary's bank by
number only and the number does not correspond to the intended
bank or (2) the payment order contains a bank number and a bank
name which refer to different banks. 47 Since automated processing
systems at the receiving banks will identify the intermediary or
beneficiary's bank by means of the identifying number and not the
name on the payment order they receive, problems can arise under
both of these fact patterns; both are resolved by Article 4A.3 48
If the bank is identified by number only, the receiving bank is
entitled to rely on the identifying number as the proper identifi-
cation of the intended bank.3 49 Moreover the receiving bank is
under no duty to determine whether in fact that number identifies
a bank.350 The sender of the payment order bearing the erroneous
identifying number will be obliged to compensate the receiving
bank for any loss as a result of its reliance on the number in
executing or attempting to execute the order. 351
When the bank name and identifying number on the payment
order refer to different banks, liability will depend on whether the
sender is a bank or non-bank and whether the sender had notice
that the receiving bank might utilize the process of numerical
identification in the processing of the payment order.3 52
If the sender is a bank, the receiving bank is entitled to rely
on the number as the proper identification of the intended bank if
the receiving bank does not know of the discrepancy between the
number and name of the bank.35 3 The receiving bank need not
determine either that such a discrepancy exists or whether the
-7 See U.C.C. § 4A-208.
34 See id. § 4A-208 comment 1.
-9 See id. § 4A-208(a)(1).
35 See id.
31" See id. § 4A-208(a)(2) & comment 2.
312 See id. § 4A-208(b).
35 See id. § 4A-208(b)(1).
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number refers to an actual bank.3 54 The sender will be obliged to
compensate the receiving bank for any losses it sustains in reliance
on that number in executing or attempting to execute the order.3 5
If the sender is not a bank, and the receiving bank can prove
that the sender, before the payment order was accepted, had notice
that the receiving bank might rely on the number as the proper
identification of the intended bank, even though the name and the
number refer to different banks, the sender will be liable as though
the sender were a bank.35 6 Proof of this notice may be accomplished
by any admissible evidence.357 One way this burden can be met by
the receiving bank is through proof that the sender, before accep-
tance of the order, signed a writing stating that it had notice of
the possibility of reliance by the receiving bank on the identifying
number alone. 35
Article 4A, in its treatment of misdescription of the beneficiary
or misdescription of a bank, clearly shows the drafters' intent to
accommodate the needs of banks that use automated means to
process payment order transactions. 3 9 A regulatory scheme that
unduly impeded the swift processing by automated means, through
the imposition of additional verification duties on the banks re-
ceiving payment orders, would jeopardize the quick, low cost na-
ture of these transactions that has made them such an efficient
means of moving money. Article 4A does not place such onerous
additional duties on the banks, but rather rationally allocates loss
liability in favor of those banks without knowledge of a mistake,
and adverse to those banks or senders that caused a mistake and
were aware of the potential for resulting losses from misdescription.
Article 4A thus accomplishes the drafters' goals of coherent regu-
lation, without imposing unwarranted economic hardships on funds
transfer participants.
1- See id. Interestingly, however, Article 4A is silent as to whether the receiving bank
must determine that the name of the bank on the payment order refers to an actual bank
or not. The assumption of the drafters is that most of these transactions are handled by
automated means, signifying that banks are identified by number alone. If there were a
receiving bank that processed these transactions manually and identified banks by name
rather than number, the question is perhaps open as to whether the receiving bank must
verify that the named bank really exists.
" See id.
See id. § 4A-208(b)(2).
357 See id.
:58 See id.
11 See id. § 4A-208 comment 3.
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G. Liability for Erroneous Execution of a Payment Order
1. Types of Erroneous Execution
In the previous sections, dealing with misdescription liability,
the focus was on the allocation of liability for losses from errors
that originated with the sender of a payment order. The focus in
this and the next several sections will be on the allocation of
liability for losses flowing from errors that originate with the
receiving bank. The first issue to be discussed is liability for a
payment order that is erroneously executed by the receiving bank.
Article 4A deals with several varieties of erroneous execution
of a payment order: (1) the receiving bank executes the order by
issuing a payment order in an amount greater than the amount of
the sender's order; (2) the receiving bank issues a payment order
in execution of a sender's order and then issues a duplicate order;
,(3) the receiving bank executes a sender's payment order by issuing
a payment order in an amount less than the amount of the sender's
order; and (4) the receiving bank executes a sender's payment order
by issuing a payment order to the wrong beneficiary3 60 In all of
these cases of erroneous execution, the sender's payment obliga-
tions to the receiving bank will be defined differently from what
they ordinarily would. 361
2. Liability for Erroneous Execution
In the first two situations, overpayment or duplicate orders,
the receiving bank will be entitled to payment of the amount of
the sender's order. 62 The receiving bank will be entitled to recover
from the beneficiary of the erroneous order any excess payment to
the extent allowed by the law governing mistake and restitution.3 61
A recent case illustrating recovery through the law of mistake and
restitution, under the laws of New York State, which recently
adopted Article 4A, 364 is Banque Worms v. BankAmerica Interna-
- See id. § 4A-303.
16, See id. § 4A-303 comment 1. As the comment indicates, the sender's payment
obligations to the receiving bank are defined by § 4A-303 in this situation; section 4A-303
takes precedence over § 4A-402(c) in the case of erroneous execution by the receiving bank.
362 See id. § 4A-303(a).
363 See id.
3- See N.Y. U.C.C. §§ 4A-101 to 4A-507 (McKinney 1991).
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tional. 65 In that case, a receiving bank mistakenly issued a dupli-
cate payment order to effect the same transaction. In the suit for
recovery brought by the receiving bank against the beneficiary it
mistakenly paid, the court held that the "discharge for value"
doctrine of the law of restitution would allow the beneficiary to
keep the money. 366 Under the doctrine, a third party's mistaken
payment on a debtor's behalf to an innocent creditor need not be
refunded to that third party; hence the receiving bank would not
be entitled to recovery.3 67 Although the newly adopted Article 4A
could not be applied retroactively to the case,368 the court noted
that Article 4A stipulates that the applicable law of mistake and
restitution should govern any recovery by the receiving bank in
such an instance. 69
When the receiving bank executes a payment order by issuing
a payment order in an amount less than that of the sender's
payment order, the receiving bank will be entitled to full payment
of the sender's payment order, so long as the receiving bank
corrects its mistake by issuing an additional payment order for the
benefit of the beneficiary of the sender's order. 370 If the mistake is
not corrected, however, the issuer of the erroneous order will only
be entitled to receive or retain, from the sender of the order it
accepted, the amount of the erroneous order. 371 This rule does not
apply when a payment order is issued in a lesser amount than the
order of the sender so that charges and expenses for services to
effect the transaction can be collected.372
If the receiving bank executes the payment order of the sender
by issuing a payment order to the wrong beneficiary, and the funds
transfer is completed with a payment to that wrong beneficiary,
the sender of the payment order that was erroneously executed,
and all prior senders, are not obliged to pay the payment orders
3 570 N.E.2d 189, 568 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. 1991). The case came before the New
York Court of Appeals as a certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.
31 See Banque Worms v. Bank America Int'l, 570 N.E.2d 189, 196-197, 568 N.Y.S.2d
541, 548-49 (N.Y. 1991).
67 See id., 568 N.Y.S.2d at 548-49; see also RESTATEMENT OF REsTrrUTION § 14 (1937).
See Banque Worms, 570 N.E.2d at 195, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
31 See id. at 196, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 548. For a discussion of the court's resolution of
this case, see "Discharge for Value" Rule Applied to Wire Transfer Mistake, U.C.C.
Bulletin, April 1991, at 5-6.
:7 See U.C.C. § 4A-303(b).
71 See id.
372 See id.
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they issued.3 73 Again, the issuer of the erroneous order may recover
from the wrongly paid beneficiary to the extent allowed by the law
governing mistake and restitution.374
The question remains undecided under Article 4A as to the
result if the receiving bank erroneously executes a sender's payment
order by issuing a payment order to the wrong beneficiary's bank,
resulting in no payment being made.3 75 Most likely, under the
"money-back guarantee" provision of Article 4A,376 the sender
would not be obliged to pay the receiving bank, or would be
entitled to a refund with interest if it already had paid. This right
to a refund exists because, in such an event, the sender's order did
not lead to acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of an order
directing that bank to pay the beneficiary. 377 Under the money
back-guarantee, every party to the transaction will get its money
back, unless some bank in the chain of the funds transfer sus-
pended payments .378
3. Duty of the Sender to Notify of Erroneous Execution
If the sender of an erroneously executed payment order receives
notice from the receiving bank of the execution of the order, or
notice of its account being debited to pay for the order, the sender
comes under a duty to (1) exercise ordinary care to determine, on
the basis of the information available to it, whether the order was
erroneously executed, and (2) notify the receiving bank of the
relevant facts within a reasonable time, not to exceed 90 days from
the date of notification of acceptance or account debit. 379 If the
sender fails in these duties, the bank will not be obliged to pay
any interest on the amount refundable to the sender as a result of
the erroneous execution of the payment order. 30 The rationale for
"I See id. § 4A-303(c).
17, See id.
171 See Baxter & Bhala, Proper and Improper Execution of Payment Orders, 45 Bus.
LAw. 1447, 1461 (1990) [hereinafter Baxter & Bhala II].
376 See U.C.C. § 4A-402(c).
I" See Baxter & Bhala II, supra note 375, at 1461-62.
171 See id. at 1462; supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (explaining the treatment
of suspension of payments by an intermediary bank under U.C.C. § 4A-402(e)).
379 See U.C.C. § 4A-304.
3- See id. U.C.C. § 4A-402(d) provides that in general, any time a sender is not
obliged to pay all or part of the amount of a payment order, the bank receiving payment
is obligated to refund the sender's money with interest as calculated under U.C.C. § 4A-
506. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (explaining Article 4A's interest for-
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this provision is the same as the rationale for denying interest to
a sender that fails in the duty to notify of unauthorized transac-
tions. 8' Prompt notification may assist the bank in recovering its
money, so the sender that delays notice is encouraged to give
prompt notice on pain of losing the interest on his refund.3 82
The 90 day reasonable notice provision is subject to variation
by agreement, or funds transfer system rule, so that counsel for
senders will want to be on the alert for such provisions in any
agreement to be executed or for the rules of any funds transfer
system being employed by the sender. 83
H. Liability for Late Execution, Improper Execution, or Failure
to Execute
1. General Liability for Late and Improper Execution
In addition to establishing liability rules for a receiving bank's
erroneous execution of a payment order, Article 4A also includes
a scheme of liability allocation for late execution of a payment
order, improper execution of a payment order, and for the failure
of a receiving bank to execute a payment order at all. 384 Each of
these is treated separately under Article 4A.
If a funds transfer is completed, but the execution has resulted
in a delay in payment to the beneficiary, the bank whose execution
caused the delay will be obligated to pay interest to either the
originator or the beneficiary of the funds transfer for the period
of delay.385 The expectation with most wire transfers (except au-
tomated clearing house transactions) is that they will be completed
the same day as they were begun. So, delay in execution is an
aberrational result for which Article 4A creates an interest penalty
as an incentive for receiving banks to execute promptly if they
choose to accept a payment order. 386 The normal practice is to
mula). However, the sender's failure to notify of unauthorized transactions under U.C.C.
§ 4A-204, and failure to notify of erroneous execution under U.C.C. § 4A-304, are the two
exceptions to this rule of refund with interest.
"I See U.C.C. § 4A-304 comment.
382 See id. § 4A-204 comment 2.
"I See Patrikis, Baxter & Bhala, supra note 279, at 240.
3 See U.C.C. § 4A-305.
I" See id. § 4A-305(a). The interest will be calculated on the basis of U.C.C. § 4A-
506. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (explaining Article 4A's interest for-
mula).
31 See U.C.C. § 4A-305 comment I.
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compensate the beneficiary's bank so it can compensate the bene-
ficiary by back-valuing the payment by the number of days of
delay, thereby putting the beneficiary in the same position he would
have been in had the funds transfer been completed on time.3 7 No
other damages, except consequential damages, are recoverable for
late execution.311
If the receiving bank did not merely delay in executing the
payment order, but rather made an improper execution by (1) not
completing of the funds transfer, (2) failing to use the intermediary
bank designated by the originator, or (3) issuing a payment order
not in compliance with the terms of the originator's payment order,
the receiving bank will be liable to the originator for its expenses
in the funds transfer and for additional incidental expenses and
interest losses not covered by the interest penalty for delay.8 9 As
above, no other damages, except consequential damages, may be
recovered for improper execution. 390
2. Consequential Damages Liability
For both late execution and improper execution, consequential
damages may be awarded to the extent that they are provided for
in an express written agreement of the receiving bank. 391 Some
banks may be willing to execute such an agreement in exchange
for a higher funds transfer services fee.392 While the term conse-
quential damages is not defined in the statute, the drafters meant
the term to include indirect damages, such as lost profits, lost
investment opportunities, and losses attributable to price fluctua-
tions (if the payment was a commodity). 393
This rule of no consequential damages without prior express
written agreement is in contrast to Article 4A's other rule on
consequential damages available to the beneficiary that is refused
rightful payment by the beneficiary's bank.394 In that context,
See id.
3 See id. § 4A-305(a); infra notes 391-402 and accompanying text (discussing conse-
quential damages).
389 See U.C.C. § 4A-305(b) & comment 2.
3- See id. § 4A-305(b).
39, See id. § 4A-305(c).
392 See id. § 4A-305 comment 2.
91' See Baxter & Bhala II, supra note 375, at 1463.
394 See U.C.C. § 4A-404(a) & comment 2; supra notes 176-88 and accompanying text
(explaining consequential damage availability to the beneficiary in this context and the
beneficiary's bank's defense of reasonable doubt as to the right to payment).
[VOL. 80
UCC ARTICLE 4A
consequential damages are available so long as the beneficiary can
show that the beneficiary's bank had notice of certain "special
circumstances"-namely, that refusal to pay would lead to speci-
fied consequential damages to the beneficiary. 395 This "special cir-
cumstances" rule on consequential damages derives from the
holdings in cases such as Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp.396 The
court in Evra held that under the common law notion of conse-
quential damages in contract law, as exemplified by the classic case
of Hadley v. Baxendale, the defendant bank would not be liable
for the consequential damage claims, valued in excess of $2 million,
since it had no notice that such a large amount of damage could
be caused by its failure to pay a mere $27,000 to the beneficiary. 397
In contrast, the rule on consequential damages for improper
or late execution requires prior express written agreement as a
predicate to liability; mere notice of "special circumstances" will
not suffice. The rationale for this requirement is that personnel of
the receiving bank that process payment orders are not the appro-
priate people to evaluate complex consequential damages risks in
relation to the price being charged for wire transfer service. 398 Even
if higher level management personnel were making these evalua-
tions, it would have to be done individually for each payment
order. Such a result would not be consonant with the high speed,
low price, mechanical nature of the wire transfer processing sys-
tem.399 The argument essentially states: "Whether banks can con-
tinue to make EFT services available on a widespread basis, by
charging reasonable rates, depends on whether they can do so
without incurring unlimited consequential risks. Certainly no bank
would handle for $3.25 a transaction entailing potential liability in
the millions of dollars." 4°° The position taken by the drafters of
Article 4A is that the originator of the funds transfer is in the best
position to (1) evaluate the risk of late or improper execution and
(2) manage that risk by issuing a payment order in sufficient time
to allow for monitoring of the transaction and correction of any
error. 401 Thus, without an express agreement to be liable for con-
- See U.C.C. § 4A-404(a).
39 673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982). For a discussion of Evra, see supra notes 179-81 and
accompanying text.
39 See Evra, 673 F.2d at 956.
39 See U.C.C. § 4A-305 comment 2.
3 See id.
411 Id. (quoting an industry amicus brief in Evra).
401 See id.
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sequential damages, contrary to the rule in Evra and other cases,4
notice of special circumstances is not enough to establish liability
for improper or late execution.
3. Failure to Execute
If a receiving bank fails to execute a payment order that it was
obliged by agreement to execute, the receiving bank will be liable
to the sender for its expenses in the transaction and for incidental
expenses and interest losses resulting from the failure to execute. 4 3
Any additional damages, including consequential damages, are re-
coverable only with a prior express written agreement signed by
the receiving bank.4 Without an agreement obligating the receiving
bank to accept the sender's payment orders, the failure to execute
creates no liability. 405
4. Attorney's Fees
Reasonable attorney's fees are recoverable by the originator or
the beneficiary for late or improper execution if demand for such
compensation is made of the receiving bank and refused before
action is brought on the claim.4 If a claim for damages for failure
to execute is brought and the agreement to accept payment orders
does not provide for damages, reasonable attorney's fees will be
recoverable as compensation if a demand for compensation is made
of the receiving bank and refused before an action is brought on
the claim. 40 7 There will not be any award of attorney's fees for
failure to execute if the agreement to accept contains a damage
provision. This is because the parties have already agreed on a
measure of damages, which may or may not have contemplated
attorney's fees.4°s
5. Variation by Agreement
The liability of a receiving bank to an originator or beneficiary
for late or improper execution may not be varied by agreement. 409
See Gatoil, 104 F.R.D. 580; Central Coordinates, Inc. v. Morgan Guaranty Trust
Co., 494 N.Y.S.2d 602 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985), aff'd, 502 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986).
401 See U.C.C. § 4A-305(d). Such agreements are discussed in U.C.C. § 4A-212.
- See id. § 4A-305(d).
401 See id. § 4A-305 comment 3.
4% See id. § 4A-305(e).
See id.
41 See id. § 4A-305 comment 4.
40 See id. § 4A-305(f) & comment 5.
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However, banks' counsel should advise their clients that establish-
ing early cut-off times for the processing of funds transfer business
will reduce the likelihood of liability for delay in execution.410
Although, competitive pressures in the banking industry will limit
the ability of banks to demand earlier than practicable cut-off
times for their funds transfer users. 41
CONCLUSION
Article 4A represents the best available framework for closing
the gaps in the current law applicable to funds transfer activity.
Article 4A is especially needed today, given the currently unsettled
nature of the United States financial sector. By answering the
presently unanswered legal questions that funds transfer activity
raises, Article 4A will lend precisely the sort of predictability
needed for the continuation of this country's high speed, low cost,
efficient mode of funds transfer processing. Given the need for
uniformity in this country's banking laws, some may argue that
federal rather than state adoption of Article 4A is needed for quick
and uniform enactment of its provisions. 412 Yet, regardless of how
Article 4A is implemented, its implementation is the precise sort
of remedy needed for the confusion that now confounds courts
trying to resolve liability issues with no coherent statutory or
common law framework to guide them. This commentator urges
the adoption of Article 4A, post-haste.
410 See Patrikis, Baxter & Bhala, supra note 279, at 241-42.
4,1 See id. at 242.
412 See Goldstein, Federal Versus State Adoption of Article 4A, 45 Bus. LAw. 1513
(1990).
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